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WORKING PAPER #14

SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL AND DEFENCE: PUBLIC ATTITUDES IN CANADA

The 1988 CIIPS Public Opinion Survey

by Michael Driedger & Don Munton

December 1988

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K1R 7X7

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PREFACE

CIIPS Working Papers are the result of research work in progress, often intended for later publication by the Institute or another organization, and are regarded by CIIPS to be of immediate value for distribution in limited numbers--mostly to specialists in the field. Unlike all other Institute publications, these papers are published in the original language only.

The opinions contained in the papers are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of the Institute and its Board of Directors.

Don Munton is a Professor of Political Science at the University of British Columbia. Michael Driedger is a graduating student in history, also at the University of British Columbia.

CONDENSÉ

Le rapport qui suit présente les résultats du deuxième sondage concernant les opinions de la population canadienne sur les affaires internationales; le sondage a été commandé par l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales. Le premier sondage, exécuté pendant l'été 1987, avait porté sur les points de vue des Canadiens et Canadiennes au sujet des superpuissances et des tensions Est-Ouest. Le deuxième, qui a eu lieu en juin et juillet 1988, reprend certaines des questions du premier sondage et analyse aussi les attitudes concernant l'avenir de la limitation des armements, du désarmement et de la politique de défense du Canada.

Tout comme celui de 1987, le sondage national d'opinion fait en 1988 a été commandé et financé par l'Institut canadien pour la paix et la sécurité internationales, et il a été conçu par Don Munton et le personnel de l'Institut. Le sondage comportait cinquante et une questions en tout, et il a été mené en juin et juillet 1988 par le Longwoods Research Group; il portait sur un échantillon national constitué au hasard de façon à être représentatif des ménages canadiens; le bassin dressé par Market Facts Ltd. comptait 30 000 ménages. En tout, 1 005 personnes ont répondu au questionnaire qui avait été envoyé par courrier en anglais et en français. Le taux de réponse a atteint 63 p. 100. (Dans le cas des échantillons de cette taille, la marge d'erreur est d'environ 3 p. 100, 95 fois sur 100. Sur les 1 005 répondants en 1988, 563 avaient également participé au sondage de 1987.)

Le document examine d'abord la manière dont sont perçus les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique, et il confirme dans une large part les résultats du sondage de 1987 : par rapport à il y a vingt-cinq ans, la population canadienne a maintenant une opinion fondamentalement différente des deux superpuissances,

et plus particulièrement des États-Unis. Le document analyse ensuite de près la nature de la menace qui, selon les répondants, pèse sur le Canada ainsi que sur la paix et la sécurité mondiales; sur ce plan aussi, les résultats montrent qu'il faut délaisser certains mythes d'autrefois. Puis, l'auteur se penche expressément sur ce qu'on pense des risques de guerre nucléaire; à cet égard également, il découvre des faits frappant attestant d'un changement dans la façon dont les Canadiens et Canadiennes imaginent le spectre d'une catastrophe nucléaire.

Quel que soit le critère de mesure employé, les douze mois s'étant écoulés entre le milieu de 1987 et juillet 1988 ont été une période extraordinaire dans le domaine des affaires internationales. L'analyse actuelle se distingue notamment par un examen de l'évolution qu'a connue au cours de la période considérée la façon dont les Canadiens et Canadiennes perçoivent les deux superpuissances et les relations Est-Ouest, c'est-à-dire de l'évolution des attitudes prédominantes par rapport à ce qu'elles étaient avant les grands événements s'étant produits au cours de l'année.

L'auteur s'intéresse ensuite brièvement aux politiques internationales que la population canadienne favorise, voire préconise, pour faire face au danger de guerre et à ce qui, selon elle, menace la sécurité du pays. Parmi ces politiques, citons, par exemple, celles concernant une interdiction complète des essais, le recours en premier aux armes nucléaires en Europe, et en particulier, ce que l'on pourrait appeler l'avenir nucléaire (la question de savoir s'il est souhaitable de réduire, voire d'éliminer, les arsenaux nucléaires).

Le document étudie aussi les opinions sur diverses questions de défense intéressant tout particulièrement le Canada, par exemple, l'engagement pris par notre pays envers l'Organisation du Traité de l'Atlantique Nord et le niveau des dépenses militaires canadiennes. Bien peu d'éléments portent à conclure que la population canadienne est anti-militaire et qu'elle soit même "non militaire" si, par cet adjectif, on veut décrire une hésitation à maintenir les budgets militaires en temps de paix. Les Canadiens et Canadiennes ne sont certes pas "non militaires", si l'on entend par ce terme qu'ils n'ont pas d'attitudes cohérentes en matière de défense et de sécurité. Ils favorisent assez fortement la défense conventionnelle, vu le contexte stratégique canadien, bien que tous s'entendent clairement pour rejeter tout rôle d'ordre nucléaire pour leur pays.

Enfin, l'auteur analyse les importantes différences se faisant jour dans les attitudes de divers groupes de Canadiens et Canadiennes. Ces différences sont plus particulièrement fonction de l'âge, du sexe, de la langue et de la région. Ces écarts démographiques semblent cependant moins frappants à certains égards que l'essence des perceptions et des attitudes mêmes.

A l'annexe D du document de travail, le lecteur trouvera toutes les questions et la répartition des réponses données à chacune d'entre elles.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The following report presents the second in a series of surveys on Canadians' opinions on international affairs sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The first of these surveys, carried out in the summer of 1987, focussed on Canadians' views of the superpowers and the east-west conflict. The second, based on a survey of Canadians during June and July of 1988, returns to some of those questions and also probes attitudes concerning the future of arms control and disarmament and Canadian defence policy.

The 1988 national public opinion survey, as the one conducted in 1987, was commissioned and funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and designed by Don Munton and Institute staff. Comprising 51 questions in all, the survey was carried out in June through July, 1988 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. A total of 1,005 people responded to the questionnaire which was conducted by mail in both English and French. The response rate was 63%. (The margin of error with samples of this size is approximately +/- 3%, 95 times out of 100. Of the 1,005 respondents to the 1988 survey, 563 were also respondents to the 1987 survey.)

The paper examines first the perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union, and largely confirms what the 1987 survey found -- a striking, indeed fundamental, shift in Canadians' views of both superpowers, and particularly of the United States, from that which existed twenty- five years ago. It then looks closely at perceptions of threat to Canada and to global peace and security -- and again suggests that some old myths need to be shed. It then looks specifically at perceptions of the possibility of nuclear war -- and, once again, finds some striking evidence of a change in the way Canadians view the spectre of a nuclear catastrophe.

The paper then turns briefly to the international policies Canadians favour, and in some cases, advocate, to deal with the perceived threats to their security and the danger of war. These include, for example, the idea of a comprehensive test ban, the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and, in particular, what might be termed the nuclear future -- that is, the desirability of reductions in nuclear weapons and their possible elimination.

It looks, as well, at attitudes on a number of defence policy issues of particular interest to Canada, such as the Canadian commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the level of Canadian defence expenditures. There is scant evidence here for concluding that Canadians are anti-military and little that they are even "unmilitary", if by that label is meant a reluctance to maintain defence expenditures in peace time. Canadians are certainly not "unmilitary" in the sense that they have no coherent attitudes on defence and security. Their support for conventional defence are quite strong, considering the Canadian strategic context, though there is a clear consensus against a nuclear role for Canada.

Finally, the important differences in attitudes amongst various groups of Canadians are considered. These differences are most notable with respect to age, gender, language and region. Such demographic differences, however, seem in some ways less striking than the substantive nature of the perceptions and attitudes themselves.

All of the questions and the breakdown of responses to each are listed in Appendix D of this working paper.

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INTRODUCTION

The following report presents the second in a series of surveys on Canadians' opinions on international affairs sponsored by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security. The first of these surveys, carried out in the summer of 1987, focussed on Canadians' views of the superpowers and the East-West conflict. The second, based on a survey of Canadians during June and July of 1988, returns to some of those questions and also probes attitudes concerning the future of arms control and disarmament and Canadian defence policy.

The twelve months from mid-1987 through to mid-1988 were, by any measure, an extraordinary year in international affairs. Most prominently, they witnessed the signing by the United States and the Soviet Union, during a summit meeting in Washington, of the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement, the first genuine disarmament agreement of the post-war period. The year saw not only a second superpower summit meeting, this time in Moscow, but also movement toward an even more far-reaching agreement for the reduction of strategic nuclear weapons. There was also progress toward agreements to end or reduce regional conflicts in other parts of the world.

One of these agreements provided for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan, a long-standing issue for western countries since 1979. The Soviet intervention in that year has been the event many observers have used to mark the formal beginning of a new cold war-like period in East-West relations that pervaded the early- to mid-1980s. Progress was also achieved toward a multi-party resolution of the on-going wars in Namibia and Angola, where Cuban troops have, to many in the West, represented a Soviet proxy force. The year 1988 also saw, among other events, the destruction of an Iranian airliner, and the deaths of all its passengers and crew, shot down by a missile from an ultra-modern American Navy warship in the Persian Gulf.

THE SURVEY

The 1988 national public opinion survey, like the one conducted in 1987, was commissioned and funded by the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security and designed by Don Munton and Institute staff. Comprising 51 questions in all, the survey was carried out in the period of June through July 1988 by the Longwoods Research Group with a national sample selected randomly to be representative of Canadian households and chosen from a panel of 30,000 households maintained by Market Facts Ltd. A total of 1,005 people responded to the questionnaire which was conducted by mail in both English and French. The response rate was 63%. (By comparison, the 1987 survey, which was conducted in part during a mail service strike in Canada, had a response rate of 48%.) The margin of error with samples of this size is approximately +/- 3%, 95 times out of 100. Of the 1,005 respondents to the 1988 survey, 563 were also respondents to the 1987 survey.

PURPOSE AND FORMAT

The purpose of the present working paper, like that of the one produced in conjunction with the 1987 survey, is not to generalize about Canadian public opinion in all its multi-faceted character, nor even to summarize the results of recent surveys in Canada on international issues. Rather, the purpose is to present and describe the results of this particular survey. The format of the working paper can be outlined briefly.

The paper examines first the perceptions of the United States and the Soviet Union, and largely confirms what the 1987 survey found -- a striking, indeed fundamental, shift in Canadians' views of both superpowers, and particularly of the United States, from those which existed twenty-five years ago. It then looks closely at perceptions of threat to Canada and to global peace and security -- and again suggests that some old myths need to be shed. It then looks specifically at perceptions of the possibility of nuclear war -- and, again, finds some striking evidence of a change in the way Canadians view the spectre of a nuclear catastrophe. One of the features of the present analysis is an examination of change in Canadians' perceptions of the two superpowers and of East-West relations from mid-1987 to mid-1988, that is, the change in prevailing attitudes from what they were before the major developments of this extraordinary year to what they were in its aftermath.

The paper then turns to the international policies Canadians favour, and in some cases, advocate, to deal with the perceived threats to their security and the danger of war. These include, for example, the idea of a comprehensive test ban, the first use of nuclear weapons in Europe, and, in particular, what might be termed the nuclear future -- that is, the desirability of reductions in nuclear weapons and their possible elimination. It looks as well at attitudes on a number of policy issues of particular interest to Canada, such as the Canadian commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the level of Canadian defence expenditures.

Finally, the important differences in attitudes among various groups of Canadians will be considered. These differences are most notable with respect to age, gender, language and region. Such demographic differences, however, seem in some ways less striking than the substantive nature of the perceptions and attitudes themselves.

All of the questions and the breakdown of responses to each are listed in Appendix D of this working paper. Note that both the percentages in the appendix and those cited in the text exclude "don't know" and "no answer" responses and are rounded off to the nearest percentage point. Thus the responses for any one question may total more than 100%.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS BY CANADIANS

International relations in the 1980s continue to be set in an environment largely dominated by the two post-war superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The nature of the relationship between the two superpowers has changed to some degree at least, however, and the opportunity to compare Canadians' perceptions of both in 1987 and 1988 may provide a measure of the extent to which these changes are appreciated by non-experts.

Perhaps the most general question pertaining to the foreign policy of Canada's major ally and southern neighbour was "How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?" As in 1987, the majority of Canadians in 1988 express little or no confidence (53%). Only slightly fewer (47%), however, say they have "very great" or "considerable" confidence. Stated differently, the bulk of Canadians are in the middle of the range, either with considerable or little confidence. On the extremities of opinion, more are negative than positive; 15% express very little or no confidence in American foreign policy while a meager 4% have a very positive impression of the US.

With respect to confidence in the USSR, the respondents are generally more negative than positive (58% vs 42%) -- but, perhaps surprisingly, do not have much less confidence overall in the Soviets' than the Americans' ability to deal with world problems. Again, the bulk of Canadians seems to be in the middle, having considerable (39%) or little (40%) confidence in the ability of the Soviet Union. On the extremes, as in regard to the US, more are negative than positive. Nineteen percent express very little or no confidence while only 3% have a "very great" degree of confidence in the USSR.

It is of interest that evaluations of both superpowers have become somewhat more positive since the last CIIPS survey in the summer of 1987. (For comparative graphs of changes between 1987 and 1988, see Appendix A.) At that time 34% had considerable confidence in the United States and 46% had only a little confidence when they judged American foreign policy. By comparison, a few more now express considerable confidence than little (43% vs. 38%), although the difference is within the error margin for samples of this size. Otherwise, there is essentially no change in the data. (There were 3% "very greats", and 17% "none" in 1987; the figures for 1988 are 4% and 15%, respectively).

Overall confidence in the Soviet Union's ability to deal with important world problems also increased between 1987 and 1988, and increased slightly more than that for the United States. Last year only a quarter of Canadians (26%) had considerable confidence and almost half (49%) had little confidence in Soviet policy. In 1988 more now have considerable and fewer have little confidence; the figures are 38% and 40%, respectively. Stated differently, the ranks of those essentially positive about the USSR are up from 28% to 42% while the ranks of those essentially negative are down from 73% to 59%.

This slight increase in positive opinion might have been expected with the recent progress in arms control, especially the signing of the INF Treaty, and the apparent improvement of East-West relations through the first half of 1988. Confidence in the US might have been lowered somewhat, on the other hand, by the downing of the Iranian passenger plane which took place during the period in which the survey was being conducted.

The survey also asked about the long-term goals of the United States and the Soviet Union. In short, do Canadians think that each superpower is mainly interested in world domination or in preservation of its national security? A comfortable majority (67%) are of the latter opinion with respect to the US while one-third (32%) believe its aim is world domination. Parallel results are found concerning the Soviet Union. Approximately three in five (61%) think that the Soviet Union wants to ensure its own national security interests while two in five (39%) believe it is aiming at world domination.

This question was not asked in 1987, but a somewhat similar one was. It read as follows: "Is the United States more or less content with its power or influence in the world today, or is it trying to increase its area of influence?" The distinction between increasing influence, on the one hand, which could presumably include the overt use of military forces but not necessarily reflect global ambitions, and the striving for world domination, on the other, would seem to be important and one not missed by most Canadians. In 1987, fully 81% felt that the US wanted to extend its sphere of influence and 79% agreed regarding the USSR. In short, although most Canadians think both superpowers want to extend their influence, most do not see either as pursuing unlimited global control.

PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS AND ARMS CONTROL

Of relevance to the topic of confidence in the two superpowers were two questions concerning Canadians' perceptions of American policies and leadership in the area of arms control. Respondents were first asked to give their assessment of whether or not American leaders truly want disarmament. Despite the arms control progress of the Washington and Moscow summits, a majority (55%) still feel that US leaders do not genuinely desire a reduction in nuclear stockpiles, while 45% believe they do.

While the majority of Canadians are clearly not convinced that the Reagan administration is whole-heartedly working for progress on disarmament issues, there has been a small but possibly significant shift in opinion from 1987. Last year only about one in three (37%) thought the American government truly wanted nuclear disarmament; most (63%) felt that the US leadership did not want arms reductions.

This skeptical majority is now smaller by about 8% while those saying US leaders do want disarmament is up by the same amount. Despite the progress of the past year, and this small but probably statistically significant shift in perceptions, many Canadians still clearly doubt the arms control intentions of the government of the country in which they are supposed to have the most trust. It is interesting to note that, when compared with results to this question concerning the USSR (see below), attitudes toward the two countries have become more parallel.

What of Soviet concerns regarding disarmament? Do the Soviet leaders genuinely have this goal? The opinions of the CIIPS survey respondents are evenly divided. One-half (50%) feel the Soviets do want disarmament while the other half (50%) believe they do not.

Unlike the perceptible positive shift in attitudes toward the American leadership on disarmament, no change of significant proportions has ocurred for the Soviets. In part this may be due to the fact that the Soviet leadership was more positively rated in 1987 on this score than the American. A small majority of respondents in 1987 (54%) thought the USSR leaders did not want arms reductions; the remainder (46%) felt the Soviets did. The difference between 1987 and 1988, though in the positive direction, is well within the margins of error for the two surveys.

The questionnaire also focussed on the personal trustworthiness of both Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev on arms control issues. Although many Canadians tend to be skeptical about US policies on disarmament, there is somewhat more trust in the President himself as he nears the end of his term in office. Of the over 1,000 participants in the 1988 survey, 65% find Reagan either very trustworthy (9%) or somewhat trustworthy (56%). The remainder (35%) had little or no trust in the outgoing president.

Consistent with the general, but not always strong, positive trend developing in perceptions of the United States since 1987, there has been an increase in positive evaluations of the President's trustworthiness on nuclear and arms control issues. Compared to the present almost two-thirds positive rating, 1987 opinion was almost evenly split on how much Reagan should be trusted. Only 52% said he was trustworthy while 48% felt he was not.

General Secretary (and now also President) Gorbachev is regarded quite favourably by Canadians, as indeed he is by respondents to surveys in most other Western countries. Fully 71% now find Gorbachev to be trustworthy on arms control and nuclear weapons issues. Only 29% think otherwise. On this dimension Gorbachev also seems to have gained; he received a trustworthy rating from only 58% in the 1987 poll. When this change is compared with the improved results for Reagan detailed above, it seems that both leaders have gained roughly equally in positive opinion, most likely because Canadians tend to credit both superpowers with recent progress in disarmament (see below) and with the general improvement in relations between their respective nations. (For graphical depictions of these changes, see Appendix A.)

Another aspect of superpower performance on arms control and disarmament concerns assurance of compliance with agreements once they have come into effect. Verification measures were significant aspects of the negotiations for, and the provisions of, the INF treaty. The 1988 respondents were confronted with statements (not used in the 1987 questionnaire) with which they were either to agree or disagree: "With disarmament agreements, the United States (or the Soviet Union) cannot really be trusted to entirely keep its part of the bargain."

With respect to the US, a majority (54%) disagree and thus presumably believe, on the contrary, that the US would be a trustworthy signatory to an arms treaty. The rest (46%) agreed that the Americans would likely violate, at least in some way, any agreement they signed. As in some earlier described questions, however, very few respondents had strong opinions one way or the other.

Attitudes concerning the trustworthiness of the Soviet Union as a whole to live up to its disarmament agreements were less positive than those on Gorbachev's leadership on the same issues. A bare majority (51%) think the USSR could not be trusted to fulfill entirely its treaty obligations if an arms agreement were to be signed. About as many are more trusting and apparently believe Soviet intentions and actions would match.

Still on the topic of opinions on the Soviet Union, another question asked: "Do you believe that the Soviet Union is sincere in wanting to limit arms equally on both sides, or is its aim primarily to use arms control agreements as a way to lock in a Soviet advantage in arms?" While 40% thought the USSR was trying to acquire or secure a military advantage at the negotiating table, 60% thought the Soviets sincerely intended to limit arms.

The present survey strongly confirms the tendency evident last year for Canadians to evaluate the two superpowers' policies more or less equally positively or negatively, as the case may be. Two additional things can be said in general terms about the way in which perceptions of the US and the USSR have shifted over the past year. First, Canadians have a slightly more positive view of both countries in 1988 as compared to 1987. Given the extraordinary events of the year, however, attitudes might have been expected to change even more than they have. Second, in instances where this improvement is less obvious (for example, perceptions of the general leaderships' desire for disarmament), the gap between opinions of the two countries has diminished.

In the 1988 results, as in those of 1987, there is a striking pattern in the relationship between the perceptions of the US and USSR. In short, most Canadians now have either a positive perception of both superpowers or a negative one of both. (See the graphs in Appendix B.) This pattern is, of course, quite different from that of the cold war period when most Canadians, as indeed most people in all Western countries, had essentially positive views of the United States and negative views of the Soviet Union.

The 1988 CIIPS questionnaire also included two questions dealing with the relative power of the United States and the Soviet Union. One of these dealt with present realities, the other with what future situation would be most desirable. With respect to the first, most Canadians (65% in the 1988 sample) regard the military power of the superpowers as roughly equivalent. A minority (25%) feel that "the United States is weaker than the Soviet Union in overall nuclear forces." Only 9% are of the opinion that the US has an advantage.

Which of the two countries do Canadians think should have the greater military power in terms of nuclear weapons? The vast majority of Canadians prefer that neither superpower be predominant. That is, they believe it would be best if parity existed rather than a predominance of power on one side; fully 82% were of this opinion. Only 16% thought it would be best for the Americans to have an advantage over the Soviets in total nuclear strength while 3% thought it best for the Soviets to lead militarily.

PERCEPTIONS OF THREAT BY CANADIANS

For many in the West, the Soviet Union has since the Second World War generally been considered the greatest threat to peace. It is not uncommon to encounter such views today, as evidenced by the statement from the federal government's 1987 Defence White Paper: "The principal threat to Canada continues to be a nuclear attack on North America by the Soviet Union." How do Canadians view this issue in 1988?

When requested to disagree or agree with the statement that "the Soviet military threat is constantly growing and represents a real, immediate danger to the West," opinions are split almost half and half. About as many respondents (49%) disagree with the claim as agree (51%).

By comparison, fifty-eight percent of respondents to the 1987 survey agreed that the USSR was a threat, a shift of seven percentage points. Although statistically speaking this amount of change may not be worthy of note, it is almost to be expected given similar changes in Canadian attitudes toward both superpowers in the wake of arms control breakthroughs.

The survey respondents were also asked for what reason in particular they thought that the Soviet military was a threat, if at all. Roughly 52% of Canadians, according to the survey, felt that "the Soviet Union is a military threat because its military forces might be used in the future, as they were in Afghanistan." Another 36% consider the USSR a threat largely because it has nuclear weapons which it could use in the future. Only 12% of respondents said the USSR is in no way a threat.

The matter of where exactly this Soviet threat might be realized seems much less clear. In contrast to the above figures, which perhaps imply that the USSR is regarded by most as a military threat, Canadians do not seem to expect an actual Soviet attack. Most (78%) regard a Soviet attack on Western Europe in the next ten years as either unlikely or very unlikely. Even more (85%) regard an attack on North America in the same period as unlikely or very unlikely. Similar opinions are held concerning other regions. Fully 88%

and 81% of respondents think an attack against Japan or China respectively is not to be expected.

These expectations, or lack thereof, seem to be reflected also in the responses to a question about the "greatest threat to world peace." Only a small percentage of Canadians (5%) perceive the USSR to be the greatest threat. Perhaps surprisingly, 11% of the survey's respondents held this opinion about the United States. What now seem to be of most concern to Canadians are the problems posed by the nuclear arms race, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and regional disputes. The nuclear arms race was singled out by about a quarter (23%) of the sample while one-third (32%) of respondents named nuclear proliferation as the threat that most concerned them and another quarter (24%) named the conflict in the Middle East as the most grave danger. The remaining 4% located the major threat to world peace in other areas.

These results are quite consistent with those from a similar question in the 1987 study. Then 29% saw the spread of nuclear weapons to be of most concern, followed by the arms race and the turmoil in the Middle East (both at 27%). American actions, Soviet actions and miscellaneous conflicts were the next to be named (8%, 5% and 4% respectively).
These results may help explain why, on the one hand, the USSR is considered by about half of the population to be a significant military threat, and, on the other hand, is not considered to be the greatest threat to peace. Canadians tend to think the USSR is most concerned with its own security and is unlikely to initiate a deliberate attack on the west. The problem for world peace is not the Soviet Union's bellicosity per se, but rather the instability evident in recent years in the superpower relationship -- and other potential conflicts (perhaps exacerbated by horizontal nuclear proliferation). The concern of the 1987 White Paper, noted above, with an

apparently deliberate Soviet attack is thus not shared by most Canadians. Their concern, it appears, is less with preventing specifically a Soviet attack than with generally preventing a nuclear war.

But what of the causes of such a nuclear war? When asked the question, "Which do you think is a more likely cause of a nuclear war, a nuclear attack triggered by accident or a deliberate attack?", a clear majority (59% in 1988 and 57% in 1987) answer that accidental war is the more likely. The remainder (41% in 1988 and 43% in 1987) think a premeditated attack would more likely be the cause of a nuclear conflict.

Following up this question, the survey participants were asked: "Whichever you believe is more likely - an accidental or deliberate attack - who is more likely to be responsible for it?" Nearly equal numbers of people thought that one of the superpowers was likely to be the initiator of a nuclear war. (Only 13% pointed to the Soviet Union and 10% the United States). A third (32%) speculate that both the US and the USSR would be responsible for setting off such a war. More respondents, and nearly a majority (45%), would point the finger of blame at other sources.

The 1988 data reveal fewer respondents than in 1987 who see both the US and the USSR as being equally liable to initiate a nuclear confrontation. Last summer 40% thought this was the most likely scenario (versus 32% in 1988). About the same number or slightly fewer of the 1987 respondents were in each other category: 40% for other causes, 11% for the USSR, and 9% for the US.

Regardless of who may eventually be more to blame for a nuclear exchange, most Canadians do not expect a nuclear war in the near- to mid-term future. Answering the question, "Within the next twenty-five years, how likely do you think it is that there will be a nuclear war?", only 31% regard war a strong possibility, while 69% are of the contrary opinion.

It is interesting to contrast results from another 1987 survey question on the same theme. Last summer the respondents were also asked if "there is much danger of nuclear war or not much danger." Most (55%) thought that there was a danger of war, while 45% felt there was not much danger. The differences in question wording make it difficult to compare directly these two questions. The major difference between the two is that the one asked in 1988 contained the qualifying phrase of "within the next twenty-five years." One might conjecture that Canadians fear nuclear war as a real possibility, but also as only a distant possibility.

The 1988 survey results suggest, in fact, that the perceived threat of nuclear exchange has actually diminished, at least over the past decade. Asked to compare the present situation with that of ten years ago, one-half of Canadians (47%) say that the chances of nuclear war have been reduced. Just over a quarter (26%) think the danger of nuclear war has neither been reduced nor increased. A similar proportion (27%) believe the nuclear danger has increased compared to the late 1970s.

There appears to have been a significant drop in the perceived chance of nuclear war compared with the situation ten years ago. (Although not exactly the same, there are only minor phrasing differences in the two versions of the question.) In 1987 the largest group of respondents (44%) said that the danger of nuclear war had increased compared to ten years prior. Thirty-one percent felt there had been no change in the likelihood of war. Only 25% saw less danger than ten years earlier. Thus there has been, in one year, a decline (from 44% to 27%) in the proportion who perceive a greater danger and a rise (from 27% to 47%) in the proportion who perceive less danger. The extent of the shift here seems much greater, to the extent it can be compared, than that in the perceptions of either superpower. The change is perhaps best explained by noting that, in the space of a year, the usually frustrating arms negotiating process has produced uncommonly dramatic results and, at the same time, tensions between the two superpowers seem to have diminished.

ATTITUDES TO SECURITY POLICIES

If the foregoing are some of the key perceptions of Canadians concerning the threats to their security, then what are the policies most likely to deal with these threats?

Canadians' policy preferences in this area are undoubtedly varied and complex, as the results of the previous 1987 CIIPS survey suggested. They may, however, stem from basic underlying premises about weapons and the use of force. It is to such general issues that the focus here turns first.

It is clear, first of all, that most Canadians believe in the basic principle of nuclear deterrence. When asked in 1987 whether they agreed or not with the statement, "Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union is likely to launch a nuclear attack because both know the other would retaliate," the vast majority (86%) agreed. One in three, overall, strongly agreed.

Secondly, and notwithstanding their belief in the principle of nuclear deterrence, most Canadians do not think nuclear weapons necessarily increase security. Indeed most seem convinced that there are too many nuclear weapons currently in existence. In 1988 as in 1987, the CIIPS respondents were asked to agree or not with the following statement: "The security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons." So strong is the general support for disarmament that over four out of five (82%) of the 1988 group agree. Only 18% disagree with this statement.

On the surface, identical results were obtained when this question was asked last year. As in 1988, 82% felt security would be best ensured by equivalent reductions on both sides and only 18% did not think bilateral reductions would be good for security. On closer inspection, fewer respondents in 1988 than in 1987 are strongly of this opinion (i.e. in 1987 34% strongly agreed while another 48% just agreed, compared to 21% and 61%,respectively in 1988). It is unlikely that these differences are of major importance, and they may be due merely to question order differences and to minor formatting differences in the two questionnaires. (The responses were arrayed with the "agree" categories first in 1987 and the "disagree" categories first in 1988.)

Third, Canadians clearly have a strong aversion to the idea of using nuclear weapons, even in a situation where the Western countries are under conventional attack and losing ground. On the 1987 questionnaire respondents were asked what they thought the West should do if "NATO forces in Western Europe were being overwhelmed by a conventional attack from the Soviet Union,...accept defeat and Soviet control of Europe... or make use of nuclear weapons and risk global nuclear war." Only about one in three (37%) of those who had an opinion were in favour of the policy of the first use of nuclear weapons; most (62%) replied "accept defeat...". (One in five overall were undecided or refused to choose.)

The 1988 survey contained a similar question on NATO and the issue of the "first use" of nuclear weapons. It read: "The NATO alliance should be prepared to use small nuclear weapons as a last resort against a Soviet conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) attack in Western Europe [if it] were overwhelming Western defences." Despite a different wording to the scenario (that is, the reference to "small" nuclear weapons, the reference to "as a last resort," and the lack of reference to risking "a global nuclear war," the results are almost exactly the same. Only a minority (37%) support the proposal. Most (67%) either strongly disagree (28%) or simply disagree (38%). The fact that the possible first use of nuclear weapons in such a situation is a basic NATO doctrine is almost certainly not something of which most Canadians are aware.

Finally, it appears that Canadians are generally not much persuaded of the utility of force in today's world. Most (77%) agree with the statement "military force is no longer an appropriate way for countries to pursue their interests." About one-quarter (22%) disagreed.

These various attitudes on security would seem largely consistent one with another. For example, if force generally is not an appropriate instrument of policy, then the use of nuclear weapons can hardly be justified. And, given existing stocks of nuclear weapons, if the basic principle of nuclear deterrence is valid and if nuclear weapons should not be used in a war-fighting situation, then it is unclear why more nuclear weapons would make anyone more secure. These general beliefs also seem consistent with, and may help explain, many of the results on more specific security policy questions.

ATTITUDES TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT

Clearly the most significant arms control development between the United States and the Soviet Union during the past decade is the INF Treaty signed in Washington in December 1987 and ratified during the subsequent Moscow Summit in June 1988. Although both sides have claimed responsibility for this achievement, neither side seems to have scored a decisive public relations victory, at least not with the Canadian public. A few respondents give greater due to the efforts of the United States (12%) and a few to those of the USSR (15%). Two-thirds (67%) of the CIIPS sample afford both superpowers some credit for securing this historic agreement. The rest (6%) suggest that neither of the two countries were really responsible for the treaty.

It is also clear that most Canadians have a reasonably accurate perception of the impact of the treaty with respect to the elimination of nuclear arms in the world. When asked how much of the total combined nuclear stockpiles of the US and the USSR were to be eliminated under the INF agreement, a large majority (87%) correctly said that the INF agreement would get rid of only "a very small percentage." Only about one in seven had an exaggerated idea of the treaty's effect; about 11% thought that half the nuclear weapons were to be removed and 2% thought that the treaty removed most weapons.

The question was also asked: "Do you think the treaty makes the world more safe or less safe, or doesn't it make much difference at all?". One-third (31%) were of the opinion that the treaty did make an important contribution to world peace, but two-thirds (67%) stated the treaty did not make much difference to the likelihood of peace or war. A few, only 2%, thought the recent progress toward arms limitation in fact reduced international security.

The reason for this rather reserved reaction to the treaty is probably the perception that the reductions it will effect are too little, a point reinforced by the fact that Canadians continue to perceive a serious threat from the current abundance of nuclear weapons.

Despite the lack of optimism concerning the possible benefits of the INF agreement, Canadians are more hopeful with regard to the START negotiations. The text of the applicable question read: "As you may know, the United States and the Soviet Union were talking at the recent Moscow summit about cutting, by 50%, their strategic, long-range nuclear forces, such as intercontinental missiles. Do you think such an agreement would make the world more safe or less safe or doesn't it make any difference?" Almost half (47%) expressed the opinion that such an agreement would improve international security, and a further 51% thought that if such an agreement were reached it would make little or no difference to the current situation. As in the case of the question concerning the INF Treaty, few (only 2%) said that an agreement on the reduction of ICBMs would make the world less safe.

Opinion was about equally divided on the desirable timing of such an agreement. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents felt that the superpowers should try to reach an agreement on the reduction of long-range nuclear forces as soon as possible, but the remainder (43%) disagreed. The latter group supported the idea that no ICBM reductions should be made "until we know if the Soviet Union is living up to existing agreements."

These results concerning the INF and a possible START agreement lead naturally to further and broader questions concerning the future of nuclear arms control and disarmament and, indeed, concerning the future of nuclear weapons. That is, do Canadians think nuclear arms should -- and could -- be eliminated?

The CIIPS respondents were first requested to select one of two policy options as the most desirable for a general goal, either "the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world" or "for major countries like the United States and the Soviet Union to have just enough nuclear arms so no country would dare attack them." Elimination is clearly favoured. Nearly two out of every three (64%) prefer complete elimination while one in three (36%) opt for what might be described as a "minimum deterrence" option.

The respondents were then immediately requested to state their opinion on the following statement: "Some people say that nuclear weapons actually help prevent war, and that the world would be a more dangerous place without them. This is because they believe a war would be more likely if we only had conventional non-nuclear weapons." Most (61%) indicate they agree or strongly agree with this argument, a key one in the case for the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent.

Later in the questionnaire the respondents were asked about the degree of arms reduction they think would be desirable. Only a minority (23%) think it would be best to reduce armament levels by half over the next ten years or to leave them at present levels. Almost as many (22%) prefer only one-tenth of current weapons stocks should be kept. Most Canadians, well over half (55%), favour the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

At first glance, there would seem to be an obvious, and perhaps rather glaring, contradiction in Canadians views here. On the one hand, most say they prefer the elimination of nuclear weapons as a general goal, rather than the maintenance of some weapons, and most also say that over the next ten years all, not just some or most, nuclear weapons should be eliminated. On the other hand, and between expressing these two views, most agree that nuclear weapons help prevent war and that war would be more likely if there were only conventional weapons.

If there are, in fact, some contradictions here, they are not apparent in the thinking of most Canadians. The overall figures hide important and highly significant differences among individuals. These are well worth some close examination.

Looking first at the relationship between the responses to the question on eliminating nuclear weapons versus maintaining some (question 14 in the questionnaire in Appendix D) and the question on whether nuclear weapons prevent war (question 15), there is, as might be expected, a strong correlation. Those who favour elimination as a general goal tend to disagree with the argument that nuclear weapons prevent war. (Fully 35% of the entire sample take these positions jointly.) Correspondingly, those who think some nuclear weapons ought to be maintained tend to believe also that they do, in fact, prevent war more effectively than conventional weapons. (Slightly fewer, about 32%, take these positions.) There is also a somewhat smaller group (28% of all respondents) that expresses support for elimination as a general goal but then agrees with the argument that nuclear weapons help prevent war. If there is a contradiction in the thinking of some Canadians, or if some respondents changed their minds when presented with the second argument, they are in this group. It might be noted, though, that the group is a minority. (Only about 4% of the sample argue for keeping some nuclear weapons but then disagree that nuclear weapons prevent war.)

There is an even stronger correlation, again as might be expected, between the responses to the question on elimination (versus maintaining some nuclear weapons) and that on the desirable level of arms reductions over the next ten years (i.e., questions 14 and 22). Of those who support elimination as a general goal, most opt in the later question for reductions down to zero. (Of the entire sample, almost half -- 48% -- favour this combination.) Of the "pro-elimination" group, the next largest proportion suggests reducing either by 90% or 50% over the next ten years. (This combination is preferred by about 15% of the whole sample.) Of those who believe that some nuclear weapons ought to be maintained, most opt for reducing either to 50% or to 10% of present stocks over the next decade. (A total of 25% of the respondents favour this combination.) Of the same group, only a very small proportion favour maintaining all existing nuclear weapons (3% of the entire sample) while slightly more, in apparent contradiction, say in response to the second question that they favour 100% reductions (7-8% of the entire sample).

There is, finally, a relationship as well between the responses on whether nuclear weapons help prevent war (question 15) and on the level of arms reductions that would be desirable (question 22). In short, those people who disagree that nuclear weapons help prevent war tend to favour their elimination while those who agree tend to favour the retention of at least some. Only a small group of respondents (about 10%) are skeptical about the value of nuclear weapons in preventing war and still favour the retention of some or most. About one in four (26%), overall, agree with the argument that nuclear weapons are more effective than conventional ones in preventing war but nevertheless (and later in the questionnaire) support their complete elimination.

If there is a group with contradictory views, then, it would seem to be only this last minority group. It might be argued, however, that there is not necessarily a real contradiction here; their logic is perhaps that while nuclear weapons may be a more effective deterrent than conventional forces, the extraordinary costs of any nuclear conflict outweigh the decreased likelihood of its occurrence. It should be noted, therefore, that what appeared at first to be a broad contradiction on the part of many Canadians turns out on closer inspection to be, if a contradiction at all, then one of a distinct minority.

Any apparent contradiction in attitudes might also be explained by noting some differences in question wording. The first question asked respondents to give their opinion on disarmament in general terms, "as a general goal," and it asked what would be most desirable if only the issue of nuclear arms elimination, versus maintaining some weapons, were being considered? On the other hand, the question which revealed support for the idea that nuclear weapons provide a better deterrent than conventional ones, also associated this argument explicitly with the prevention of war. The third in the series of questions then asked about targets for arms reductions over the next ten years. A period in which some respondents may think other changes might occur affecting the desirability of nuclear weapons.

What effect will disarmament agreements have on the arms race, that is, on the development and deployment of new weapons systems? This was the focus of the following statement with which respondents were asked to agree or disagree: "Some people think that a substantial reduction in present nuclear weapons would significantly slow down the arms race. Others say that even if both the United States and the Soviet Union did reduce the numbers of their existing weapons, they will continue to develop and produce even more destructive weapons, and thus the arms race will continue." One-third (32%) think that arms reductions would actually help end the arms race. Two-thirds (68%) feel that the arms race would continue, despite disarmament on such a scale.

Given that most respondents expect the INF agreement to make little if any difference to our safety in a nuclear world, and that there seems to be little hope for the cessation of the arms race, do Canadians therefore feel that there is no reason actively to pursue further arms talks? The answer is "no." However pessimistic they may be that the arms race will continue regardless of disarmament successes, most still believe disarmament and arms control are priorities. Queried on the importance of three possible measures -- the reduction of conventional weapons or of strategic weapons, and the control of chemical weapons -- more than four in five say each of these is very or somewhat important, and in only one case did more than a small handful of respondents say the measure is unimportant.

Are there particular priority areas in which Canadians would most prefer to see progress? The answer is yes. Controlling chemical weaponry is one that greatly concerns Canadians. Fully 80% of the 1988 respondents replied that arms negotiations on the topic of chemical weapons are very important. Most of the rest feel they are somewhat important and only 3% regard them as not very important. More or less equal stress is placed on the reduction of long-range nuclear forces. According to the 1988 survey, 71% of Canadians regard this measure as very important and presumably want the negotiating process concerning these arms to continue and to progress. Twenty-five percent regard it as somewhat important while a meager 3% recognize no importance in this process.

In contrast to the cases of chemical and nuclear weapons, Canadian opinion did not place as much or as forceful an emphasis on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. About four in ten (38%) said it was necessary while about the same proportion (44%) felt it was somewhat important. Two in ten (18%) said it was not important.

The respondents were also asked whether they agree or disagree that "banning all tests of nuclear weapons would eventually undermine Western strength and our ability to deter Soviet aggression." Of decided respondents, 57% either disagree or strongly disagree with the statement. Forty-three percent either agree or strongly agree.

The same issue of a comprehensive test ban was addressed in the 1987 questionnaire with a somewhat differently worded question: "There has been a great deal of debate on the need for a complete ban on the testing of all nuclear weapons both in the air and underground. Some people say that the maintenance of a strong deterrence force can be guaranteed only by regular testing of existing and experimental future nuclear weapons. Others say that to stop the arms race we must stop the development of new weapons and that a total ban on all testing would help achieve this. Which one opinion is closest to your own?" Fully 81% of Canadians advocated a ban on all weapons testing.

What accounts for the difference in the responses to the two questions? There is more emphasis in the 1988 question on the connection between testing weapons, on the one hand, and safeguarding Western strengths and deterring use of forces by the Soviets, on the other. The 1988 question also lacked any mention of a possible relationship between stopping the arms race and prohibiting weapons testing, a linkage which may have helped attract respondents in the earlier poll. Given this "tougher" wording of the 1988 version, it is interesting to note that support for a comprehensive test ban remains as strong as it does.

ATTITUDES TO INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION

A key feature of the INF Treaty is its extensive and far-reaching provisions dealing with verification matters. To explore these issues, another section of the questionnaire focussed on inspection and verification of arms control treaties and the testing of weapons.

In the 1987 CIIPS survey respondents were asked with which of two statements they agreed more, either: "We should not agree to any substantial disarmament unless inspection of nuclear facilities in all countries is so careful that there is no risk of cheating." or "No inspection system is perfect. We should be willing to accept some risks to get a disarmament agreement." Given the choice between these two alternatives, a bare majority (51%) opted for the necessity of inspection.

In 1988 respondents were asked simply to agree or disagree with the first of these two assertions. Eighty-four percent agree with this statement, and only 16% disagree. (There is thus a difference of 31% in the level of agreement in the two questions.) This difference probably has to do, at least in part, with the change in question format. When an alternative choice is provided, and perhaps especially one that is couched in terms with which most Canadians would be inclined to be sympathetic (i.e., "getting a disarmament agreement"), the necessity for perfect inspection (i.e., with "no risk of cheating") seems to be less.

While a clear majority of those answering the survey thought that negotiations should put emphasis on safeguards or verification, opinions on what degree of certainty is possible on the issue of arms inspection, show that most Canadians are doubtful that all arms agreement violations could be identified. Only 42% agree that "the West can almost certainly detect if the Soviets are cheating on a disarmament agreement." The rest (58%) disagree.

ATTITUDES TO CANADIAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES

Since the publication in the summer of 1987 of the White Paper on Defence, Canada's first in almost two decades, media attention has focussed primarily on its most controversial aspect -- the acquisition of a small fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. The CIIPS survey dealt with this and other current and uniquely Canadian policy issues -- an increase in defence forces, support for the Western Alliance, the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and the funding of defence programmes.

Before attitudes on these policy issues are discussed, however, it is interesting to observe how influential the respondents think Canada is, the only question in this set for which there existed an identically worded match in the 1987 CIIPS survey. Only 5% feel Canada has a great deal of influence in international affairs, and a mere 2% saw no evidence whatever of Canadian influence. Most people had a much more moderate impression of Canadian power in international matters. A total of 55% said that Canada has some influence, while 39% thought it has very little.

Opinion on this question seems to have changed, perhaps quite significantly, since the 1987 survey. One year ago most Canadians rated the nation's influence more modestly; most said then that Canada had very little influence (52%) while only 32% thought Canada had some influence. In 1988, as noted above, most say it has some influence. The explanation for this apparent shift can at best be a matter of speculation. It may be partly real and partly artificial.

First, the more positive evaluations may reflect the impact on public thinking of the series of international meetings which Canada hosted, and in which it played a major role, between late 1987 and mid-1988 -- the Commonwealth, la Francophonie, and the seven nation Economic Summit. Second, the differences may as well be the consequence of what pollsters call an "instrument effect." Although the wording of the 1987 and 1988 questions was exactly the same, their location in the respective questionnaires was not. On the 1987 survey, this item was placed toward the end of the questionnaire following questions dealing with the superpowers and with topics like nuclear war and disarmament, issues on which Canada, as a non-great power and without nuclear weaponry, has only an indirect role. Having thus been forced to reflect on a series of matters largely beyond Canada's influence, respondents were perhaps predisposed toward modest evaluations of the country's capabilities. On the 1988 questionnaire, in contrast, the question was located at the beginning of the survey, thereby avoiding the same context and any such psychological impact by the questions themselves.

Canadians' views on defence policy issues cluster around three or four main points, and these points represent what many defence experts would regard as the basic questions of security policy for a lesser power in a conflictual world.

These questions are: (1) What alignment or defence arrangements are most desirable? (2) What level of defence expenditures is necessary? And (3) What military capabilities are possible and appropriate? (A fourth possible question, concerning the general policies that ought to be followed, cannot be addressed here at any length due to the limited extent to which it was a focus of the CIIPS survey.

None of the attitudinal shifts described earlier, appear to have yet shaken Canadians' convictions about their international alignment. Support for continued NATO membership appears as strong as ever. Indeed, few Canadians (20%) want even to reduce that role, let alone withdraw outright from the alliance. Most (80%) reject the idea of any reduction. (This compares with the 89% who opted for continued membership, rather than withdrawal, in a 1984 United States Information Agency (USIA) poll conducted in Canada.)

Most Canadians, furthermore, clearly believe in the basic "power politics" principle of maintaining a military balance in Europe. (About 70% agreed or strongly agreed with a statement on the 1987 CIIPS survey that "Although it's been over 40 years since we have had a World War, it is still necessary to maintain a military balance in Europe to prevent open aggression and hostilities.")

Consistent with this principle, Canadians support maintaining if not increasing the country's military contribution to NATO. Last year's poll found that half wanted the level of Canada's forces in Europe maintained while almost one-quarter preferred to increase it. (These figures are little changed from the early 1960s when the question was last asked.) About 10% thought the forces should be reduced and slightly less than 25% opted for outright withdrawal of these forces. (Since neither action would necessarily mean Canada's withdrawal from NATO itself, of course, these results are in not inconsistent with those on membership per se.)

The figures are all the more remarkable when juxtaposed with the strong tendency of Canadians to regard the protection of Canada's territory and sovereignty as the best reason for any possible increase in defence forces.

Respondents in the CIIPS survey were asked: "If the Canadian government were to increase its defence forces, what, in your opinion, would be the best reason for doing so?" Of the three options provided, no less than three out of four (74%) chose "doing a better job in guarding [Canada's] territory and sovereignty." The aim of increasing the country's influence in NATO finds favour with only 18%, while a very small minority of 8% see the best reason as helping defend other Western countries.

Contrary to what is often assumed, the vast majority of Canadians generally understand what NATO is and does. (Gallup surveys through the 1960s found about 75% could provide a reasonable description of NATO objectives in response to an open-ended question. A 1984 Goldfarb survey found 78% knew Canada had armed forces in Europe; less than 10% incorrectly thought it did not.)

One of the major complaints about the state of the Canadian forces is that they are insufficient in size and equipment to fulfill their duties effectively. The claim is that the responsibilities of the forces have remained or increased, while their preparedness has failed to keep pace. The White Paper calls this the "commitment-capability gap." The size of Canada's defence effort has, of course, often been criticized by observers -- on a per capita or per dollar of

GNP basis, let alone on its totality. Some suggest Canada is a classic alliance "free rider."

Whether or not that charge is justified in terms of effort, relative or otherwise, the idea is not a line of thinking to which Canadians seem prone. Over 40% agree or strongly agree in the CIIPS poll that the Canadian government should spend more on defence. While this figure means, of course, that about six in ten disagree, most of these almost certainly want defence spending to remain about the present level. Numerous surveys over the 1980s have shown that the proportion of those who approve existing expenditure levels is about double that of those who think them too high. Moreover, according to numerous polls, strong majority support for maintaining or increasing defence expenditures has existed in Canada since at least the beginning of the 1980s.

Support has actually increased in recent decades for enlarging the armed forces. At the time of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, a height of the cold war period, Canadians were evenly divided between those who wanted to maintain the forces at existing levels and those who wanted to increase their size. In the 1987 CIIPS poll, when the same question was asked, respondents favoured, by a 2 to 1 ratio, increasing the size of the forces over maintaining them at the same level. The proportion in favour of decreasing their size was unchanged and almost negligible.

One of the factors operating here is undoubtedly the public acceptance of the validity of many ministerial statements and a litany of criticisms in the media during the last decade or so regarding the poor condition (or antiquated nature) of much of the Canadian Armed Forces' equipment--from frigates through battle tanks to small arms. But another factor may be operating here as well.

In a USIA poll, conducted a month after the Mulroney government won the 1984 election, Canadians were asked whether or not their country was contributing its fair share toward Western defence. Given that the average person tends to be a little defensive about admitting to be a shirker, and Canadians are almost certainly no exception, it is revealing that no less than 44% accepted the idea that Canada was not doing its fair share. Only 25% insisted stoutly that their country was indeed doing so. "Free riding" would not seem to be a particularly prominent instinct of Canadians.

One important caveat here: whatever support exists for increased defence spending appears, in the pollsters' term, "soft." The CIIPS respondents were asked immediately subsequently to the question on defence spending levels whether or not the Canadian government should increase taxes to provide the funds necessary for increased defence spending. Of those who had said defence expenditures ought to be increased, about one-third (32%) agreed that a tax increase would be acceptable.

There is at the same time a group of approximately three in ten Canadians, overall, who profess to want a greater defence effort but say they are not prepared to bite the hard bullet of higher taxes to pay for it. Alternate means exist, of course, by which increased defence expenditures might be met. Compared to cuts in other spending programs, for example, increased taxes are distinctly unpopular. Cutting social services appears the least palatable option, according to the 1984 Goldfarb poll, but almost three times as many Canadians would be willing to reduce foreign aid to pay for a larger defence budget as would accept cuts in pensions and family allowance.

In sum, the apparent softness in support for increased defence expenditures must be balanced against the unpopularity of the particular revenue options about which respondents were quizzed. One proposal certain to generate more opposition than higher government spending seems to be higher government taxes. This apparent softness must also be balanced against the fact that there is often less public acceptance, especially of higher taxes, on public opinion polls than there is in reality.

Where, then, do Canadians want defence resources directed? Most clearly and unambiguously, they reject nuclear weapons for Canada.

Only a small minority (14%) agree Canada should equip its armed forces with nuclear weapons. This result can be compared with a 1985 CBC poll which found roughly a third willing to have nuclear weapons "on Canadian soil." The subtle distinction in the questions here, between having such weapons in Canada's own arsenal and having someone else's weapons in Canada, is apparently not lost on the public.

An anti-nuclear stand, however, does not automatically translate into opposition to the Mulroney government's proposal to purchase a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines. In response to the question: "The Canadian government recently announced its intention to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposed plan?", 55% of the CIIPS respondents approve or strongly approve. Indeed, as many approve of the submarine acquisition while disapproving of Canada having nuclear weapons (44% overall) as disapprove of both (42%).

These two positions are nevertheless related: the small minority in favour of a nuclear capability are almost universally in favour of the submarines and those opposed to a nuclear capability, much the larger group, still tend more than those in favour, to oppose the submarine purchase. This is not at all to say that Canadians confuse the nuclear propulsion with nuclear weapons; previous polls suggest little such confusion. It is to say that the association, the fact that Canada would be joining an exclusive "nuclear club" of sorts, probably leads to opposition.

Lower levels of support for the subs have been found in other surveys with different question wording; not mentioning the "three oceans" role and emphasizing the multi-billion dollar cost seems to lower the level of support to around 40% or less. Price tags, however, like the prospect of higher taxes, reduce the attractiveness of many potential purchases. The policy problem in the case of the submarine proposal, unlike that for defence spending in general however, is that opposition is clearly based on more than the high price tag.

Another dimension of the conventional versus nuclear issue for Canadians concerns a possible trade-off. The respondents were asked: "If it were possible to reduce NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons, would you be in favour of or opposed to increasing defence spending to strengthen NATO's conventional forces?" By a margin of about 10%, the survey suggested that, under these circumstances, most Canadians would favour an increase in spending (56% to 44%).

PERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS

While the above results reveal much about Canadians' attitudes on peace and security issues, they do not address the question of whether Canadians differ in their attitudes according to personal, or demographic, characteristics. To do so requires analyzing the range of attitudes by demographic categorizations. The same four groupings as last year are again looked at here -- age, gender, language, and region. Rather than comparing the two years in some detail, it is enough to say that there has been little change since 1987. Significant results selected from the tables included in Appendix C will be summarized below. These are grouped in a manner similar to the above results. Thus we will deal with perceptions of the superpowers, perceptions of threat, arms control negotiations, other superpower policies, and Canadian defence policies.

Before considering these characteristics, let us ask the following question: how well informed do Canadians consider themselves to be concerning foreign policy? Just over one-half (55%) thought they were somewhat informed, 15% said they were very well informed, 29% did not think they had much knowledge of international affairs, and the remaining 5% claimed to have no knowledge whatever of world politics. To all intents and purposes, there was no variation from last year's responses to the same question.

(i) Age

For the purpose of the present analysis, respondents were first divided into three age groupings: those under 35 years of age, those between the ages of 35 and 54, and those over 54. Generally speaking, the greatest gulf lay between those people in the younger and the older categories.

This generational gap can be easily observed on a number of questions dealing with perceptions of the superpowers. The older generation of Canadians tends to have the most confidence in the policies of both superpowers to deal with world problems and also tend to have slightly more positive opinions of the United States' general objectives. For example, this category of Canadians is less likely to acknowledge Soviet trustworthiness in arms control and feel more strongly, especially when compared with the younger generation, that the United States is more interested in preserving its national security, than in domination. Older Canadians are also slightly more likely to feel that the United States should have a lead in overall military capabilities rather than parity.

In most cases, the younger generation holds somewhat different opinions. The majority among this group basically tends to distrust both the policies of the United States and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, when compared with those people older than 35 years, young people are more likely to feel the USSR can be trusted in arms bargains, and means to use negotiations to limit arms rather than trying to secure an advantage. The Americans are more likely to be seen, on the other hand, to desire world domination. In other words, young people are slightly more likely to have a positive opinion of the Soviet Union.

Those Canadians between 18 and 34 also tend more to locate threats to world peace in the arms race, while those older than 55 think that regional problems other than those associated with the arms race or the actions of the superpowers, are of most concern. On the topic of the dangers of nuclear war, Canadians older than 35 are less prone to worries than their younger fellow citizens. They are less likely to expect a nuclear war within the next twenty-five years, in addition to considering that the chance of nuclear war has diminished since the late 1970s. According to this group, any nuclear exchange that does take place is most likely to be triggered by accident, and the responsibility for this war would probably rest with countries other than the superpowers.

Perhaps because of their fear of threat from the nuclear arms race, those under 55 more strongly feel arms reductions make little difference to world safety, the arms race will continue despite weapons cuts, and, therefore, it would be most desirable to eliminate all nuclear weapons. They also tend to disagree that a comprehensive test ban would weaken Western strength. There are rather few significant differences regarding other policies of the superpowers and future developments in reducing nuclear weaponry.

Only a pair of results are noteworthy concerning attitudes on Canadian policies by age. First, the younger the respondent, the less he or she thinks that Canada does indeed have at least some influence in international affairs. Second, the younger generation of Canadians is definitely less enthusiastic about increases in government defence spending and more strongly opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons.

(ii) Gender

When perceptions of the superpowers are tabulated by gender, it becomes apparent that men are in some respects more positive than women. Men see both Reagan and Gorbachev in a more positive light than women when asked how much they trusted these two leaders on arms control. More men disagree that the United States cannot be trusted to uphold arms control agreements. On most other questions of opinion on the superpowers, there exists little variation based on sex.

Like older Canadians, men are more likely than women to be concerned about nuclear proliferation, regional conflicts and other threats to world security, and to feel that neither of the superpowers is likely to be the cause of any conflict that arises. Women, on the other hand, are more apprehensive of the effects of the arms race. They are more likely to respond that nuclear war is to be expected in the next twenty-five years, and that its danger has increased in the past ten years.

While men and women seem to share views of the INF and START talks, not all attitudes toward superpower policies are parallel. Women tend to favour the elimination of nuclear weapons more than men, are more skeptical of the West's ability to detect any Soviet attempts to cheat on arms agreements, and tend less to believe nuclear weapons help prevent war. Consistent with these opinions, more women agree with the principle of bilateral arms reductions, and feel that the elimination of all weapons is the most desirable option to help ensure peace and security.

In contrast, men are more strongly supportive of maintaining a nuclear deterrence force and tend to agree that nuclear weapons do help prevent war. Although a majority of men support the idea of arms cuts on both sides of the arms race, there is nonetheless a tendency for men to be less enthusiastic about bilateral reductions. Furthermore, men have somewhat greater confidence in the West's ability to catch Soviet arms control violations. Although the trends are not extremely strong, it might be said in very general terms that men have a tendency to be more "hawkish" while women are more likely to be "dovish" in attitudes toward superpower and arms control policies, particularly when these matters concern technology or weapons.

On Canadian policies, gender differences are less evident. While there is no difference in attitudes toward government spending increases for defence, somewhat more women oppose tax raises to implement this policy. Also women tend more to oppose the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines.

(iii) Language

Forty years of cold peace and of a significant degree of non-partisanship in foreign policy have not yet erased the traditional differences that existed between English- and French-speaking Canadians on international issues. While some significant variations related to respondents' language are to be found, however, there is nothing in this survey that approaches a fundamental cleavage between language groups.

One of the most obvious differences based on language is that Francophones tend to show less confidence in the ability of both superpowers, especially the Soviet Union, to deal wisely with world problems. While both English- and French-speakers have essentially equivalent opinions of American leaders' desire for disarmament, the latter are more skeptical of the goals of the Soviet leadership. On whether the superpowers want world domination or national security, French-Canadians differed greatly from English-speaking Canadians. While the majority of Anglophones think the USSR wants security, most Francophones are of the view that the Soviet Union aims at domination. French-speakers are also more likely to see the United States as an expansionist power, but not quite to the same degree. English-speaking Canadians tend to see both superpowers' intentions as less bellicose. When asked specifically about the existence of a military threat from the Soviet Union, Francophones tend to agree that the USSR is definitely a threat, while English-speaking Canadians tend more not to regard the Soviets as a threat.

French Canadians' more negative views of the superpowers do not seem to affect their attitudes on the greatest threat to peace. While English-speaking Canadians name conflicts and problems other than those directly involving the United States and the Soviet Union, Francophones tend to think that the superpower arms race presents the most danger to international security. On the topic of the nuclear threat, they are slightly more fearful of a nuclear war in the near future, although the majority of both English- and French-speakers think such a conflict is not likely to occur. The INF treaty has not helped make the world safer, according to French Canadians, and potential success at the START talks is generally not seen as helping much either. While English-speaking Canadians are more certain that a nuclear war would be caused by an accident, French Canadians' opinion is equally divided on this issue. As in the case of the greatest threat to peace, Anglophones tend to place the blame for war on countries other than the superpowers; Francophones are more likely to see both superpowers as initiating a conflict.

Security policy issues do not seem to give rise to as many differences based on language. The greatest gulf between English and French Canadians is on the comprehensive test ban and the importance of reductions in conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons. A reasonable majority of Anglophones would support the idea of a test ban while Francophones are divided. Majorities in both English and French Canada also particularly support the need for the control of chemical weapons and the reduction of ICBMs. On this latter topic, however, significantly more Francophones think lowering conventional forces in Europe is not very important, while significantly more Anglophones take the opposite view.

When asked about the reduction of Canada's involvement in NATO, there was once again a consensus of support across the two groups. But nearly as many French Canadians oppose an increase in conventional forces, if NATO reduces its nuclear weapons, as English-speaking Canadians favour such an increase. Francophones are also more strongly opposed to government increases in defence spending, while Anglophone opinion is split. French Canadians are also more strongly convinced that any increase for defence should not come from a rise in the level of taxation.

(iv) Region

For the most part, and for obvious reasons, the opinions of Francophones closely correspond to those of Quebecers. There are, however, interesting regional differences in attitudes and perceptions among Canadians. For convenience, the country was divided up into four regions: the Atlantic provinces, Quebec, Ontario, and the West.

Concerning the superpowers and threats to peace, some differences focussing on those in the West and the Atlantic provinces are noteworthy. Westerners have most positive views, or less negative views, of the Soviet Union. More Canadians in the West think that Soviet leaders genuinely desire disarmament and that the USSR wants to ensure its national security instead of striving for world dominance.

On issues of threat, those in the Atlantic area are more likely to expect a nuclear war would be triggered by accident. Although few differences exist regarding arms control policies, there are significant regional variations between East and West on the urgency of chemical weapons reductions.

People in Ontario and the West tend to feel a greater need for the control of these weapons.

There are two Canadian policy issues which are noteworthy with respect to regional distinctions. First, the least support for the planned acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines is found in the West, while the most support for this idea exists in Ontario. Second and finally, most people in the West and in Quebec oppose increased government funding for defence, an opinion especially strong in Quebec. In Ontario and the Maritimes, however, most people think defence spending should be increased.

CONCLUSION

In many respects -- on perceptions of the superpowers' policies, on attitudes toward nuclear weapons, and so on-- the results of the 1988 CIIPS survey confirm those of the previous year's. Canadians remain deeply skeptical of the strategic and foreign policies followed by both superpowers over the course of the 1980s. In a major shift from, say, twenty-five years ago, Canadians have developed a significantly negative evaluation of American aims and policies. At the same time they have become less suspicious of, and less negative toward, some Soviet aims and policies. In considerable numbers, Canadians now perceive the policies and weaponry of both superpowers, not just those of the USSR, as the major problem in East-West relations. The nuclear weapons stocks of both superpowers are now regarded by most as increasing the likelihood of war rather than decreasing it.

As noted in the report on last year's survey, it is important to be clear that these findings about Canadian attitudes do not suggest a rampant anti-Americanism. It is certain American policies, not America or Americans about which Canadians are negative. The shift suggests, rather, a new, post-cold war, anti-superpowerism.

It is of considerable interest that these attitudes have not changed much over the last twelve months, despite the considerable achievements of the INF Treaty, the new atmosphere of the US-USSR summits, and the progress toward solving regional conflict issues. While Canadians' images of the two superpowers have softened somewhat, they have not been fundamentally altered by these events. Indeed the largest shift noted over the mid-1987 to mid-1988 period comes in perceptions of a reduced danger of war, not in evaluations of the national policies that have presumably brought into reality this decline in tensions.

On the matter of Canadian defence policies, there is scant evidence in all of this for concluding Canadians are anti-military and little that they are even "unmilitary", if by that label is meant a reluctance to maintain defence expenditures in peace time. Canadians are certainly not "unmilitary" in the sense that they have no coherent attitudes on defence and security. While it is certainly true that there is less public debate about defence and security in Canada than many other countries, it does not necessarily follow that Canadians have uninformed or random views about matters military.

In fact, what emerges from these polls are two reasonably consistent defence policy "logics" on the part of the Canadian mass public. Those who support a greater defence effort also tend more than those who do not, to support increased taxes to pay the bill, a greater NATO commitment, and the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines; those who do not support one of these measures tend not to support the others. Closer examination of the poll results suggests, however, that neither the assumed ignorance and inconsistency nor this "unmilitary" label are accurate characterizations, especially in the context of Canada's security situation.

A clear and vital point of consensus for Canadians is their rejection of nuclear weapons for Canada. But while it is agreed that the country's defence capabilities ought to be conventional rather than involving nuclear weapons, there is less consensus on the specific defence policies that ought to be followed.

None of the changes in Canadians' attitudes about the superpowers, nuclear weapons, and East-West relations, fundamental and long-term though it seems to be, has shaken their convictions about their international alignment. Support for continued NATO membership appears as strong as ever, for example, and few Canadians want even to reduce that role, let alone withdraw from the alliance.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to express their gratitude to Geoffrey Pearson, the Executive Director of the Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security for his support of this project and to Nancy Gordon, the Director of Public Programmes, for their support and assistance. Anita Pollak of Longwoods worked on the survey above and beyond the call of duty or contractual obligations. Professor Thomas Keating of the University of Alberta and Laine Ruus, formerly head of the U.B.C. Data Library, provided assistance with identifying and cataloging the other data discussed here. Michael Driedger performed the basic computer analysis and produced the graphs used herein, as well as co-authoring the paper.

APPENDIX A

1987-88 CHANGES


How well informed are you with respect to world affairs and foreign policy issues?
very well
somewhat
not too
not at all
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1987
1988

In general terms, how much influence do you think Canada, as a nation, has on the course of world events?



In general terms, how much influence do you think Canada, as a nation, has on the course of world events?




Which ONE of the following situations do you think poses the greatest threat to world peace?
Soviet actions
US actions
Middle East
arms race
spread of arms
other
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1987
1988


Which ONE of the following situations do you think poses the greatest threat to world peace?
Soviet actions
US actions
arms race
other
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1987
1988



How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?



How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal wisely with present world problems?



How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal wisely with present world problems?



Which do you think is a more likely cause of nuclear war, a nuclear attack triggered by accident or a deliberate attack?



Whichever you believe is more likely--an accidental or deliberate attack--who is most likely to be responsible for it?



Some people believe that Soviet leaders do NOT genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they DO genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?



Some people believe that American leaders do NOT genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they DO genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?




How trustworthy would you say President Reagan is on nuclear, and arms control issues?
very
somewhat
not very
not at all
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1987
1988


How trustworthy would you say President Reagan is on nuclear, and arms control issues?
somewhat
not very
Percent
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1987
1988



How trustworthy would you say the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, is on nuclear, and arms control issues?



How trustworthy would you say the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev, is on nuclear, and arms control issues?

The Soviet military threat is constantly growing and represents a real immediate danger to the West.



The Soviet military threat is constantly growing and represents a real immediate danger to the West.





The security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons.

APPENDIX B

PERCEPTIONS OF THE SUPERPOWERS

Amount of confidence in the superpowers
to deal wisely with world problems is...
(1988)



Do the superpowers want world domination
or national security?
(1988)



Superpower desire for disarmament
(1988)



Trustworthiness of superpower leaders on arms control
(1988)



Can the superpowers be trusted to keep arms bargains?
(1988)



APPENDIX C

DEMOGRAPHIC BREAKDOWNS

TABLE 1A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Confidence in the United States			
considerable	42%	48%	53%
little	58%	52%	47%
Confidence in the Soviet Union			
considerable	40%	39%	48%
little	60%	61%	52%
Do American leaders want disarmament?			
do not want disarmament	57%	52%	56%
do want disarmament	43%	48%	44%
Do Soviet leaders want disarmament?			
do not want disarmament	49%	50%	52%
do want disarmament	51%	50%	48%
Trust of Reagan on arms control			
somewhat trustwothy	60%	66%	71%
not very trustworthy	40%	34%	29%
Trust of Gorbachev on arms control			
somewhat trustwothy	71%	74%	69%
not very trustworthy	29%	26%	31%
The Americans can't be trusted in arms bargains			
disagree	56%	54%	52%
agree	44%	46%	48%
The Soviets can't be trusted in arms bargains			
disagree	57%	45%	41%
agree	43%	55%	59%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 1A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
The Americans want domination or security?			
domination	40%	32%	23%
security	60%	68%	77%
The Soviets want domination or security?			
domination	34%	46%	39%
security	66%	54%	61%
Best military balance			
American military lead	12%	16%	20%
equality	84%	83%	77%
Soviet military lead	4%	1%	2%
Superpower nuclear balance			
United States is stronger	11%	9%	8%
US and USSR are roughly equal	67%	64%	63%
United States is weaker	22%	27%	29%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 1B Perceptions of Threat by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Greatest threat to peace			
Soviet actions	4%	5%	7%
arms race	28%	23%	15%
American actions	13%	10%	10%
other	55%	62%	67%
The Soviet Union is a military threat			
disagree	49%	46%	53%
agree	43%	42%	36%
strongly agree	8%	12%	11%
The Soviet Union is a threat because...			
of its nuclear weapons	40%	36%	30%
its armed forces may be used	50%	55%	51%
it is not a threat	11%	9%	19%
Soviet aims in arms control			
limit arms	66%	56%	57%
advantage	34%	44%	43%
Nuclear war in 25 years			
likely	37%	28%	24%
unlikely	48%	61%	60%
very unlikely	15%	11%	16%
Chance of nuclear war compared to 10 years ago			
greater	36%	23%	17%
same	25%	26%	29%
less	39%	51%	55%
Cause of nuclear war			
accident	51%	63%	68%
deliberate attack	49%	37%	32%
Responsibility for nuclear war			
the Soviets	14%	13%	12%
the Americans	14%	6%	9%
both	34%	29%	32%
some other country	38%	53%	47%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 1C Perceptions of Negotiations by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Responsibility for achieving INF Treaty			
the Soviets	13%	11%	12%
the Americans	18%	14%	10%
both	61%	70%	73%
neither	8%	5%	6%
The INF Treaty's effect on world safety			
more safe	26%	30%	41%
no difference	72%	69%	58%
less safe	3%	0%	2%
Nuclear arms eliminated by INF Treaty			
most	2%	2%	2%
half	10%	8%	16%
a very small percentage	88%	90%	82%
Effect of ICBM cuts on world safety			
more safe	41%	50%	54%
no difference	57%	48%	44%
less safe	2%	2%	2%
Strategic weapons reductions			
as soon as possible	56%	58%	56%
should wait	44%	42%	44%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 1D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Arms race after arms reductions			
will slow	28%	31%	39%
will continue	72%	69%	61%
Bilateral arms reductions are best for security			
disagree	21%	18%	14%
agree	59%	62%	63%
strongly agree	20%	21%	23%
Reduction of conventional forces in Europe			
very important	38%	37%	38%
somewhat important	41%	45%	49%
not very important	21%	18%	13%
Reductions of long-range nuclear forces			
very important	72%	70%	71%
somewhat important	25%	26%	27%
not very important	3%	3%	3%
Control of chemical weapons			
very important	74%	83%	86%
somewhat important	23%	13%	10%
not very important	3%	3%	4%
Military force is no longer appropriate			
disagree	23%	25%	21%
agree	52%	46%	51%
strongly agree	25%	30%	28%
Desirable level of arms cuts in 10 years			
maintain present levels	3%	5%	4%
maintain 50%	14%	20%	25%
maintain 10%	28%	21%	15%
eliminate all weapons	55%	54%	57%
Which is most desirable re nuclear weapons?			
eliminate all weapons	70%	65%	53%
maintain deterrence	30%	35%	47%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 1D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Nuclear weapons help prevent war			
strongly agree	12%	11%	18%
agree	44%	48%	51%
disagree	44%	41%	31%
NATO should consider nuclear arms if attacked			
strongly disagree	27%	27%	20%
disagree	42%	35%	35%
agree	31%	38%	45%
If risk of cheating, no disarmament			
disagree	19%	16%	9%
agree	44%	43%	45%
strongly agree	37%	41%	46%
The West can detect Soviet disarmament cheating			
disagree	64%	59%	48%
agree	36%	41%	52%
Banning nuclear tests weakens Western strength			
strongly disagree	17%	12%	8%
disagree	46%	48%	36%
agree	38%	40%	56%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 1E Attitudes on Canadian Policies by Age

	AGE		
	18 to 34	35 to 54	55+
Canada's influence in the world			
some influence	52%	61%	68%
very little influence	48%	39%	32%
Best reason for increasing Canadian forces			
Western defence	10%	7%	7%
influence in NATO	16%	21%	18%
guarding sovereignty	74%	72%	75%
Canada should reduce its role in NATO			
strongly disagree	21%	34%	24%
disagree	54%	51%	53%
agree	24%	14%	23%
Support for NATO if nuclear forces are reduced			
favour increase	52%	58%	61%
oppose increase	48%	42%	39%
Canada should have nuclear weapons			
strongly disagree	51%	44%	39%
disagree	37%	43%	42%
agree	12%	13%	19%
Canadian nuclear-powered submarines			
strongly disapprove	16%	17%	20%
disapprove	28%	26%	25%
approve	44%	43%	45%
strongly approve	12%	14%	10%
The government should spend more on defence			
disagree	65%	53%	51%
agree	35%	47%	49%
The government should raise taxes for defence			
strongly disagree	49%	35%	33%
disagree	41%	47%	47%
agree	10%	19%	19%

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TABLE 2A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Confidence in the United States		
considerable	52%	43%
little	48%	57%
Confidence in the Soviet Union		
considerable	43%	40%
little	57%	60%
Do American leaders want disarmament?		
do not want disarmament	53%	57%
do want disarmament	47%	43%
Do Soviet leaders want disarmament?		
do not want disarmament	47%	53%
do want disarmament	53%	47%
Trust of Reagan on arms control		
somewhat trustwothy	72%	59%
not very trustworthy	28%	41%
Trust of Gorbachev on arms control		
somewhat trustwothy	77%	66%
not very trustworthy	23%	34%
The Americans can't be trusted in arms bargains		
disagree	59%	50%
agree	41%	50%
The Soviets can't be trusted in arms bargains		
disagree	51%	47%
agree	49%	53%

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TABLE 2A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
The Americans want domination or security?		
domination	31%	34%
security	69%	66%
The Soviets want domination or security?		
domination	39%	40%
security	61%	60%
Best military balance		
American military lead	16%	16%
equality	82%	82%
Soviet military lead	3%	3%
Superpower nuclear balance		
United States is stronger	12%	7%
US and USSR are roughly equal	62%	68%
United States is weaker	26%	25%

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TABLE 2B Perceptions of Threat by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Greatest threat to peace		
Soviet actions	5%	5%
arms race	19%	27%
American actions	9%	13%
other	66%	55%
The Soviet Union is a military threat		
disagree	51%	47%
agree	38%	43%
strongly agree	11%	10%
The Soviet Union is a threat because...		
of its nuclear weapons	32%	39%
its armed forces may be used	54%	50%
it is not a threat	13%	11%
Soviet aims in arms control		
limit arms	62%	59%
advantage	38%	41%
Nuclear war in 25 years		
likely	25%	36%
unlikely	57%	54%
very unlikely	18%	10%
Chance of nuclear war compared to 10 years ago		
greater	21%	32%
same	24%	28%
less	55%	40%
Cause of nuclear war		
accident	61%	57%
deliberate attack	39%	43%
Responsibility for nuclear war		
the Soviets	11%	15%
the Americans	8%	12%
both	30%	33%
some other country	51%	39%

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TABLE 2C Perceptions of Negotiations by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Responsibility for achieving INF Treaty		
the Soviets	10%	14%
the Americans	19%	11%
both	66%	69%
neither	6%	6%
The INF Treaty's effect on world safety		
more safe	34%	29%
no difference	65%	69%
less safe	1%	2%
Nuclear arms eliminated by INF Treaty		
most	1%	2%
half	11%	11%
a very small percentage	88%	87%
Effect of ICBM cuts on world safety		
more safe	48%	47%
no difference	50%	51%
less safe	2%	2%
Strategic weapons reductions		
as soon as possible	55%	59%
should wait	45%	41%

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TABLE 2D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Arms race after arms reductions		
will slow	32%	32%
will continue	68%	68%
Bilateral arms reductions are best for security		
disagree	23%	14%
agree	54%	68%
strongly agree	23%	19%
Reduction of conventional forces in Europe		
very important	38%	37%
somewhat important	40%	49%
not very important	22%	14%
Reductions of long-range nuclear forces		
very important	70%	73%
somewhat important	27%	25%
not very important	4%	2%
Control of chemical weapons		
very important	79%	81%
somewhat important	16%	17%
not very important	5%	2%
Military force is no longer appropriate		
disagree	26%	20%
agree	44%	56%
strongly agree	31%	24%
Desirable level of arms cuts in 10 years		
maintain present levels	3%	5%
maintain 50%	20%	18%
maintain 10%	25%	19%
eliminate all weapons	52%	59%
Which is most desirable re nuclear weapons?		
eliminate all weapons	59%	69%
maintain deterrence	41%	31%

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TABLE 2D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Nuclear weapons help prevent war		
strongly agree	17%	10%
agree	48%	46%
disagree	34%	44%
NATO should consider nuclear arms if attacked		
strongly disagree	28%	22%
disagree	35%	41%
agree	37%	37%
If risk of cheating, no disarmament		
disagree	16%	15%
agree	43%	44%
strongly agree	41%	40%
The West can detect Soviet disarmament cheating		
disagree	53%	64%
agree	47%	36%
Banning nuclear tests weakens Western strength		
strongly disagree	17%	9%
disagree	43%	45%
agree	40%	46%

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TABLE 2E Attitudes on Canadian Policies by Sex

	SEX	
	male	female
Canada's influence in the world		
some influence	59%	60%
very little influence	41%	40%
Best reason for increasing Canadian forces		
Western defence	8%	8%
influence in NATO	17%	20%
guarding sovereignty	75%	72%
Canada should reduce its role in NATO		
strongly disagree	30%	23%
disagree	47%	58%
agree	22%	19%
Support for NATO if nuclear forces are reduced		
favour increase	58%	54%
oppose increase	42%	46%
Canada should have nuclear weapons		
strongly disagree	47%	44%
disagree	38%	42%
agree	14%	14%
Canadian nuclear-powered submarines		
strongly disapprove	19%	16%
disapprove	21%	32%
approve	45%	43%
strongly approve	14%	10%
The government should spend more on defence		
disagree	57%	57%
agree	43%	43%
The government should raise taxes for defence		
strongly disagree	42%	38%
disagree	38%	51%
agree	20%	11%

Canada, national survey - June-July 1988

TABLE 3A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
Confidence in the United States		
considerable	50%	39%
little	50%	61%
Confidence in the Soviet Union		
considerable	47%	26%
little	53%	74%
Do American leaders want disarmament?		
do not want disarmament	55%	57%
do want disarmament	45%	43%
Do Soviet leaders want disarmament?		
do not want disarmament	48%	58%
do want disarmament	52%	42%
Trust of Reagan on arms control		
somewhat trustwothy	66%	62%
not very trustworthy	34%	38%
Trust of Gorbachev on arms control		
somewhat trustwothy	73%	66%
not very trustworthy	27%	34%
The Americans can't be trusted in arms bargains		
disagree	53%	59%
agree	47%	41%
The Soviets can't be trusted in arms bargains		
disagree	48%	52%
agree	52%	48%

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TABLE 3A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
The Americans want domination or security?		
domination	29%	44%
security	71%	56%
The Soviets want domination or security?		
domination	35%	54%
security	65%	46%
Best military balance		
American military lead	16%	14%
equality	81%	83%
Soviet military lead	3%	2%
Superpower nuclear balance		
United States is stronger	10%	7%
US and USSR are roughly equal	64%	68%
United States is weaker	25%	26%

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TABLE 3B Perceptions of Threat by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
Greatest threat to peace		
Soviet actions	5%	5%
arms race	19%	37%
American actions	11%	11%
other	65%	47%
The Soviet Union is a military threat		
disagree	54%	35%
agree	38%	48%
strongly agree	8%	17%
The Soviet Union is a threat because...		
of its nuclear weapons	34%	41%
its armed forces may be used	54%	46%
it is not a threat	12%	13%
Soviet aims in arms control		
limit arms	61%	57%
advantage	39%	43%
Nuclear war in 25 years		
likely	28%	39%
unlikely	58%	48%
very unlikely	14%	13%
Chance of nuclear war compared to 10 years ago		
greater	27%	26%
same	26%	28%
less	48%	45%
Cause of nuclear war		
accident	63%	50%
deliberate attack	37%	50%
Responsibility for nuclear war		
the Soviets	11%	19%
the Americans	12%	5%
both	27%	46%
some other country	50%	30%

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TABLE 3C Perceptions of Negotiations by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
Responsibility for achieving INF Treaty		
the Soviets	13%	10%
the Americans	15%	13%
both	68%	64%
neither	4%	13%
The INF Treaty's effect on world safety		
more safe	35%	20%
no difference	64%	76%
less safe	1%	4%
Nuclear arms eliminated by INF Treaty		
most	1%	4%
half	10%	13%
a very small percentage	89%	83%
Effect of ICBM cuts on world safety		
more safe	50%	40%
no difference	48%	57%
less safe	2%	3%
Strategic weapons reductions		
as soon as possible	56%	60%
should wait	44%	40%

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TABLE 3D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
Arms race after arms reductions		
will slow	33%	31%
will continue	67%	69%
Bilateral arms reductions are best for security		
disagree	17%	22%
agree	62%	59%
strongly agree	21%	19%
Reduction of conventional forces in Europe		
very important	43%	22%
somewhat important	44%	46%
not very important	13%	32%
Reductions of long-range nuclear forces		
very important	74%	62%
somewhat important	24%	32%
not very important	2%	6%
Control of chemical weapons		
very important	85%	67%
somewhat important	13%	26%
not very important	2%	7%
Military force is no longer appropriate		
disagree	22%	26%
agree	51%	45%
strongly agree	27%	29%
Desirable level of arms cuts in 10 years		
maintain present levels	4%	4%
maintain 50%	18%	20%
maintain 10%	23%	19%
eliminate all weapons	55%	56%
Which is most desirable re nuclear weapons?		
eliminate all weapons	62%	69%
maintain deterrence	38%	31%

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TABLE 3D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
Nuclear weapons help prevent war		
strongly agree	12%	18%
agree	50%	38%
disagree	38%	44%
NATO should consider nuclear arms if attacked		
strongly disagree	22%	33%
disagree	40%	31%
agree	37%	36%
If risk of cheating, no disarmament		
disagree	14%	20%
agree	45%	40%
strongly agree	41%	40%
The West can detect Soviet disarmament cheating		
disagree	59%	56%
agree	41%	44%
Banning nuclear tests weakens Western strength		
strongly disagree	12%	15%
disagree	47%	33%
agree	41%	52%

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TABLE 3E Attitudes on Canadian Policies by Language

	LANGUAGE	
	English	French
Canada's influence in the world		
some influence	60%	56%
very little influence	40%	44%
Best reason for increasing Canadian forces		
Western defence	8%	10%
influence in NATO	17%	22%
guarding sovereignty	75%	68%
Canada should reduce its role in NATO		
strongly disagree	25%	31%
disagree	56%	44%
agree	19%	25%
Support for NATO if nuclear forces are reduced		
favour increase	64%	31%
oppose increase	36%	69%
Canada should have nuclear weapons		
strongly disagree	44%	51%
disagree	41%	38%
agree	15%	11%
Canadian nuclear-powered submarines		
strongly disapprove	18%	17%
disapprove	26%	29%
approve	44%	44%
strongly approve	13%	10%
The government should spend more on defence		
disagree	51%	75%
agree	49%	25%
The government should raise taxes for defence		
strongly disagree	33%	59%
disagree	49%	31%
agree	17%	10%

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TABLE 4A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Confidence in the United States				
considerable	49%	43%	53%	43%
little	51%	57%	47%	57%
Confidence in the Soviet Union				
considerable	43%	30%	45%	47%
little	57%	70%	55%	53%
Do American leaders want disarmament?				
do not want disarmament	53%	57%	54%	56%
do want disarmament	47%	43%	46%	44%
Do Soviet leaders want disarmament?				
do not want disarmament	48%	56%	54%	40%
do want disarmament	52%	44%	46%	60%
Trust of Reagan on arms control				
somewhat trustwothy	65%	64%	66%	65%
not very trustworthy	35%	36%	34%	35%
Trust of Gorbachev on arms control				
somewhat trustwothy	70%	67%	71%	76%
not very trustworthy	30%	33%	29%	24%
The Americans can't be trusted in arms bargains				
disagree	56%	59%	52%	52%
agree	44%	41%	48%	48%
The Soviets can't be trusted in arms bargains				
disagree	49%	52%	44%	52%
agree	51%	48%	56%	48%

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TABLE 4A Perceptions of the Superpowers by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
The Americans want domination or security?				
domination	26%	41%	28%	32%
security	74%	59%	72%	68%
The Soviets want domination or security?				
domination	48%	51%	38%	28%
security	52%	49%	62%	72%
Best military balance				
American military lead	25%	15%	14%	15%
equality	74%	82%	84%	81%
Soviet military lead	1%	3%	2%	4%
Superpower nuclear balance				
United States is stronger	7%	8%	9%	11%
US and USSR are roughly equal	66%	65%	66%	65%
United States is weaker	27%	27%	25%	24%

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TABLE 4B Perceptions of Threat by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Greatest threat to peace				
Soviet actions	4%	5%	5%	5%
arms race	28%	34%	19%	18%
American actions	7%	11%	11%	12%
other	61%	50%	65%	65%
The Soviet Union is a military threat				
disagree	47%	36%	53%	58%
agree	45%	48%	38%	34%
strongly agree	9%	16%	9%	7%
The Soviet Union is a threat because...				
of its nuclear weapons	36%	41%	33%	35%
its armed forces may be used	49%	48%	56%	51%
it is not a threat	15%	11%	11%	14%
Soviet aims in arms control				
limit arms	58%	57%	58%	65%
advantage	42%	43%	42%	35%
Nuclear war in 25 years				
likely	24%	39%	24%	32%
unlikely	72%	48%	59%	55%
very unlikely	4%	13%	17%	13%
Chance of nuclear war compared to 10 years ago				
greater	26%	27%	22%	31%
same	27%	28%	28%	23%
less	48%	45%	49%	46%
Cause of nuclear war				
accident	70%	52%	62%	61%
deliberate attack	30%	48%	38%	39%
Responsibility for nuclear war				
the Soviets	17%	17%	13%	8%
the Americans	5%	6%	11%	15%
both	37%	44%	25%	27%
some other country	42%	33%	51%	50%

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TABLE 4C Perceptions of Negotiations by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Responsibility for achieving INF Treaty				
the Soviets	19%	10%	12%	11%
the Americans	11%	13%	15%	18%
both	70%	65%	69%	67%
neither		12%	4%	4%
The INF Treaty's effect on world safety				
more safe	37%	21%	35%	35%
no difference	62%	76%	64%	64%
less safe	1%	4%	1%	1%
Nuclear arms eliminated by INF Treaty				
most	3%	3%	1%	1%
half	9%	12%	11%	10%
a very small percentage	88%	84%	87%	90%
Effect of ICBM cuts on world safety				
more safe	56%	40%	53%	46%
no difference	40%	57%	45%	54%
less safe	4%	3%	2%	0%
Strategic weapons reductions				
as soon as possible	50%	60%	54%	59%
should wait	50%	40%	46%	41%

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TABLE 4D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Arms race after arms reductions				
will slow	38%	30%	32%	33%
will continue	62%	70%	68%	67%
Bilateral arms reductions are best for security				
disagree	12%	20%	18%	18%
agree	67%	59%	62%	60%
strongly agree	20%	21%	20%	22%
Reduction of conventional forces in Europe				
very important	43%	25%	43%	42%
somewhat important	38%	47%	43%	45%
not very important	19%	28%	14%	13%
Reductions of long-range nuclear forces				
very important	76%	63%	72%	76%
somewhat important	23%	31%	25%	23%
not very important	1%	6%	3%	1%
Control of chemical weapons				
very important	76%	68%	85%	86%
somewhat important	21%	25%	12%	13%
not very important	3%	7%	2%	1%
Military force is no longer appropriate				
disagree	28%	24%	23%	20%
agree	44%	44%	53%	53%
strongly agree	28%	31%	24%	28%
Desirable level of arms cuts in 10 years				
maintain present levels	2%	4%	3%	5%
maintain 50%	12%	20%	23%	14%
maintain 10%	21%	20%	23%	23%
eliminate all weapons	65%	56%	50%	58%
Which is most desirable re nuclear weapons?				
eliminate all weapons	65%	70%	62%	60%
maintain deterrence	35%	30%	38%	40%

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TABLE 4D Attitudes on Superpower Policies by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Nuclear weapons help prevent war				
strongly agree	6%	17%	15%	10%
agree	60%	39%	47%	51%
disagree	34%	44%	37%	39%
NATO should consider nuclear arms if attacked				
strongly disagree	24%	29%	24%	22%
disagree	40%	33%	39%	42%
agree	36%	38%	37%	36%
If risk of cheating, no disarmament				
disagree	13%	19%	12%	17%
agree	43%	42%	42%	48%
strongly agree	44%	38%	47%	35%
The West can detect Soviet disarmament cheating				
disagree	47%	58%	60%	60%
agree	53%	42%	40%	40%
Banning nuclear tests weakens Western strength				
strongly disagree	13%	14%	12%	12%
disagree	41%	34%	48%	48%
agree	46%	51%	40%	39%

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TABLE 4E Attitudes on Canadian Policies by Region

	REGION			
	Maritimes	Quebec	Ontario	West
Canada's influence in the world				
some influence	68%	55%	62%	58%
very little influence	32%	45%	38%	42%
Best reason for increasing Canadian forces				
Western defence	7%	11%	6%	9%
influence in NATO	15%	23%	16%	17%
guarding sovereignty	78%	67%	78%	74%
Canada should reduce its role in NATO				
strongly disagree	21%	32%	27%	21%
disagree	56%	44%	54%	59%
agree	22%	24%	19%	19%
Support for NATO if nuclear forces are reduced				
favour increase	67%	35%	68%	59%
oppose increase	33%	65%	32%	41%
Canada should have nuclear weapons				
strongly disagree	35%	52%	43%	45%
disagree	42%	36%	43%	41%
agree	23%	12%	14%	14%
Canadian nuclear-powered submarines				
strongly disapprove	19%	19%	13%	22%
disapprove	23%	28%	23%	30%
approve	48%	43%	50%	36%
strongly approve	9%	10%	14%	13%
The government should spend more on defence				
disagree	41%	72%	46%	61%
agree	59%	28%	54%	39%
The government should raise taxes for defence				
strongly disagree	34%	54%	34%	35%
disagree	53%	33%	48%	48%
agree	14%	12%	17%	17%

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APPENDIX D

CIIPS SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE AND RESULTS

Question: 1

How well informed would you say you are with respect to world affairs and foreign policy issues?

Responses:

1.	very well informed	14
2.	somewhat informed	55
3.	not too informed	26
4.	not at all informed	5
	Total	100%

Question: 2

In general terms, how much influence do you think Canada, as a nation, has on the course of world events.

Responses:

1.	a great deal of influence	5
2.	some influence	55
3.	very little influence	39
4.	no influence at all	2
	Total	101%

Question: 3

Which one of the following situations do you think poses the greatest threat to world peace?

Responses:

1.	Soviet actions on the international scene	5
2.	United States actions on the international scene	11
3.	the superpowers arms race	23
4.	the spread of nuclear arms to smaller countries	32
5.	the Middle East situation	24
6.	conflicts elsewhere in the world	4
	Total	99%

Question: 4

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the United States to deal wisely with present world problems?

Responses:

1.	very great	4
2.	considerable	43
3.	little	38
4.	very little	12
5.	none	2
	Total	99%

Question: 5

How much confidence do you have in the ability of the Soviet Union to deal wisely with present world problems?

Responses:

1.	very great	3
2.	considerable	39
3.	little	40
4.	very little	14
5.	none	5
	Total	101%

Question: 6

In terms of overall nuclear forces, which one of the following statements best fits your impression of the United States and the Soviet Union?

Responses:

1.	the United States is stronger than the Soviet Union in overall nuclear forces	9
2.	the United States is weaker than the Soviet Union in overall nuclear forces	25
3.	the United States and the Soviet Union are roughly equal in nuclear forces at the present time	65
	Total	99%

Question: 7

What would be best in your opinion...?

Responses:

1. for the United States to be ahead in total military strength	16
2. for the Soviet Union to be ahead in total military strength	3
3. for the two superpowers to be about equal in total military strength	82
Total	101%

Question: 8a

Now thinking about nuclear war, within the next twenty-five years, how likely do you think it is that there would be a nuclear war?

Responses:

1. very likely	5
2. likely	25
3. unlikely	56
4. very unlikely	14
Total	100%

Question: 8b

And would you say that the chance of nuclear war breaking out is greater, is less, or is the same now as it was ten years ago?

Responses:

1. greater	27
2. less	47
3. the same	26
Total	100%

Question: 9a

In the next ten years, how likely is it that the Soviet Union would attack...Western Europe?

Responses:

1. very likely	4
2. likely	18
3. unlikely	52
4. very unlikely	26
Total	100%

Question: 9b

In the next ten years, how likely is it that the Soviet Union would attack...North America?

Responses:

1. very likely	4
2. likely	11
3. unlikely	43
4. very unlikely	42
Total	100%

Question: 9c

In the next ten years, how likely is it that the Soviet Union would attack...Japan?

Responses:

1. very likely	2
2. likely	10
3. unlikely	54
4. very unlikely	34
Total	100%

Question: 9d

In the next ten years, how likely is it that the Soviet Union would attack...China?

Responses:

1. very likely	3
2. likely	16
3. unlikely	53
4. very unlikely	28
Total	100%

Question: 10

Which one of these statements do you most agree with?

Responses:

1.	the Soviet Union is a military threat because it is a superpower with nuclear weapons	36
2.	the Soviet Union is a military threat because its military forces might be used in the future, as they were in Afghanistan	52
3.	the Soviet Union is not a military threat	12
	Total	100%

Question: 11a

Which do you think is a more likely cause of a nuclear war, a nuclear attack triggered by accident or a deliberate attack?

Responses:

1.	attack triggered by accident	59
2.	deliberate attack	41
	Total	100%

Question: 11b

Whichever you believe is more likely -- an accidental or deliberate attack -- who is most likely to be responsible for it?

Responses:

1.	the Soviet Union	13
2.	the United States	10
3.	both superpowers	32
4.	some other country	45
	Total	100%

Question: 12a

Do you believe that the Soviet Union is mainly interested in world domination or mainly interested in protecting its own national security?

Responses:

1.	world domination	39
2.	protecting its own national security	61
	Total	100%

Question: 12b

Do you believe that the United States is mainly interested in world domination or mainly interested in protecting its own national security?

Responses:

1.	world domination	33
2.	protecting its own national security	67
	Total	100%

Question: 13a

Some people believe that the Soviet leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?

Responses:

1.	do not want disarmament	50
2.	do want disarmament	50
	Total	100%

Question: 13b

Some people believe that American leaders do not genuinely want disarmament. Other people believe that they do genuinely want disarmament. Which of these views is closest to your own?

Responses:

1.	do not want disarmament	55
2.	do want disarmament	45
	Total	100%

Question: 14

As a general goal, which one of the following do you think is the most desirable?

Responses:

1. the elimination of all nuclear weapons in the world	64
2. for major countries like the United States and the Soviet Union to have just enough nuclear arms so no country would dare attack them	36
Total	100%

Question: 15

Some people say that nuclear weapons actually have helped prevent war, and that the world would be a more dangerous place without them. This is because they believe a war to be more likely if we only had conventional non-nuclear weapons. Do you...?

Responses:

1. strongly agree	13
2. agree	47
3. disagree	31
4. strongly disagree	8
Total	99%

Question: 16a

During the summit in Washington last December, there was progress made in the disarmament talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. The talks resulted in an agreement to eliminate Intermediate range Nuclear Forces in Europe, the INF Treaty. Who do you think has been more responsible for reaching this agreement?

Responses:

1. the United States	12
2. the Soviet Union	15
3. both	67
4. neither	6
Total	100%

Question: 16b

Do you think the treaty makes the world more safe or less safe, or doesn't it make much difference?

Responses:

1.	more safe	31
2.	less safe	2
3.	does not make much difference	67
	Total	100%

Question: 16c

Thinking about all the nuclear arms held by both countries, does this treaty eliminate...?

Responses:

1.	most of them	2
2.	about half of them	11
3.	a very small percentage of them	87
	Total	100%

Question: 17a

How trustworthy would you say President Reagan is on nuclear, and arms control issues?

Responses:

1.	very trustworthy	9
2.	somewhat trustworthy	56
3.	not very trustworthy	27
4.	not at all trustworthy	8
	Total	100%

Question: 17b

How trustworthy would you say the Soviet leader, Mr. Gorbachev is on nuclear, and arms control issues?

Responses:

1.	very trustworthy	5
2.	somewhat trustworthy	66
3.	not very trustworthy	23
4.	not at all trustworthy	6
	Total	100%

Question: 18

Do you believe that the Soviet Union is sincere in wanting to limit arms equally on both sides, or is its aim primarily to use arms control agreements as a way to lock in a Soviet advantage in arms?

Responses:

1. sincerely want to limit arms equally on both sides	60
2. primarily want to use arms control agreements as a way to lock in a Soviet advantage in arms	40
Total	100%

Question: 19

Some people think a substantial reduction in present nuclear weapons would significantly slow down the arms race. Others say that even if both the United States and the Soviet Union did reduce the numbers of their existing weapons, they will continue to develop and produce even more destructive weapons, and thus the nuclear race will continue. Which ONE of these two views do you most agree with?

Responses:

1. reductions will slow the nuclear arms race	32
2. more destructive weapons will continue to be developed, so the arms race will continue	68
Total	100%

Question: 20a

Various discussions are going on currently regarding arms control. Please rate how important or not each is, in your opinion: Reduction in conventional, non-nuclear forces in Europe.

Responses:

1. very important	38
2. somewhat important	44
3. not very important	18
Total	100%

Question: 20b

Various discussions are going on currently regarding arms control. Please rate how important or not each is, in your opinion: Reduction in long range nuclear weapons (i.e., the "START" talks).

Responses:

1. very important	71
2. somewhat important	26
3. not very important	3
Total	100%

Question: 20c

Various discussions are going on currently regarding arms control. Please rate how important or not each is, in your own opinion: Control of chemical weapons.

Responses:

1. very important	80
2. somewhat important	17
3. not very important	3
Total	100%

Question: 21a

As you may know, the United States and the Soviet Union were talking at the recent Moscow summit about cutting, by 50%, their strategic, long range nuclear forces, such as intercontinental missiles. Do you think such an agreement would make the world more safe or less safe or doesn't it make much difference?

Responses:

1. more safe	47
2. less safe	51
3. does not make much difference	2
Total	100%

Question: 21b

Some people say we should try to reach an agreement on these strategic weapon reductions as soon as possible. Others say we should wait until we know if the Soviet Union is living up to existing agreements, such as the INF Treaty. Which view do you most agree with?

Responses:

1. should try to reach an agreement as soon as possible	57
2. should wait until we know if the Soviet Union is living up to existing agreements	43
Total	100%

Question: 22

If it were actually possible for the nuclear powers to negotiate the elimination of many of their nuclear weapons, what sort of a reduction in nuclear weapons would you consider the most desirable, in the next ten years? Should the nuclear powers...?

Responses:

1. maintain the present levels	4
2. maintain only 50% of present levels (that is, reduce by half)	19
3. maintain only 10% of present levels	22
4. eliminate all nuclear weapons	55
Total	100%

Question: 23a

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement: The Soviet military threat is constantly growing and represents a real, immediate threat to the West.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	5
2. disagree	44
3. agree	41
4. strongly agree	10
Total	100%

Question: 23b

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree of agree with each description or statement: The NATO alliance should be prepared to use small nuclear weapons as a last resort against if a Soviet conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) attack in Western Europe were overwhelming western defences.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	25
2. disagree	38
3. agree	32
4. strongly agree	5
Total	100%

Question: 23c

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: With disarmament agreements, the Soviet Union cannot really be trusted to entirely keep its part of the bargain.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	7
2. disagree	42
3. agree	42
4. strongly agree	9
Total	100%

Question: 23d

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: With disarmament agreements, the United States cannot really be trusted to entirely keep its part of the bargain.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	7
2. disagree	47
3. agree	42
4. strongly agree	4
Total	100%

Question: 23e

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: We should not agree to any substantial disarmament unless inspection of nuclear facilities in all countries is so careful that there is no risk of cheating.

Responses:

1.	strongly disagree	3
2.	disagree	12
3.	agree	44
4.	strongly agree	41
	Total	100%

Question: 23f

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: The West can almost certainly detect if the Soviets are cheating on a disarmament agreement.

Responses:

1.	strongly disagree	8
2.	disagree	50
3.	agree	37
4.	strongly agree	5
	Total	100%

Question: 23g

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you agree or disagree with each description or statement: The security of Western countries could best be increased by substantial reductions in both American and Soviet nuclear weapons.

Responses:

1.	strongly disagree	2
2.	disagree	16
3.	agree	61
4.	strongly agree	21
	Total	100%

Question: 23h

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: Banning all tests of nuclear weapons would eventually undermine Western strength and our ability to deter Soviet aggression.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	13
2. disagree	44
3. agree	37
4. strongly agree	7
Total	101%

Question: 23i

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: Military force is no longer an appropriate way for countries to pursue their interests.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	4
2. disagree	19
3. agree	50
4. strongly agree	28
Total	101%

Question: 23j

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree of agree with each description or statement: Canada's role in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) ought to be reduced.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	26
2. disagree	53
3. agree	17
4. strongly agree	4
Total	100%

Question: 23k

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: The Canadian government ought to spend significantly more on defence.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	18
2. disagree	40
3. agree	31
4. strongly agree	12
Total	101%

Question: 23l

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: The Canadian government should raise taxes to increase its spending on defence.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	40
2. disagree	45
3. agree	13
4. strongly agree	3
Total	101%

Question: 23m

For each description or statement below, please "X" the box which represents the extent to which you disagree or agree with each description or statement: Canada ought to equip its Armed Forces with nuclear weapons.

Responses:

1. strongly disagree	45
2. disagree	40
3. agree	12
4. strongly agree	3
Total	100%

Question: 24

If the Canadian government were to increase its defence forces, what, in your opinion, would be the best reason for doing so?

Responses:

1.	Canadian forces need to be stronger to help defend the Western countries	8
2.	Canada needs to have more influence in NATO	18
3.	Canada needs to do a better job in guarding its own territory and sovereignty	74
	Total	100%

Question: 25

If it were possible to reduce NATO's dependence on nuclear weapons, would you be in favour of or opposed to increasing Canada's defence spending to strengthen NATO's conventional forces?

Responses:

1.	would be in favour	56
2.	would be opposed	44
	Total	100%

Question: 26

The Canadian government recently announced its intention to purchase ten to twelve nuclear-powered submarines, to enable the armed forces to patrol Canada's three oceans. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposed plan?

Responses:

1.	strongly disapprove	18
2.	disapprove	26
3.	approve	44
4.	strongly approve	12
	Total	100%

ANNEXE E

VERSION FRANCAISE DU QUESTIONNAIRE

Le lecteur trouvera à l'annexe D, sous forme de tableaux la présentation combinée des résultats du sondage effectué auprès des répondants anglophones et francophones. Pour obtenir une ventilation en fonction de la langue, voir l'annexe C.

1. À votre avis, à quel point êtes-vous bien informé(e) en ce qui concerne les affaires internationales et les questions de politique étrangère? Diriez-vous que vous êtes ... **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

très bien informé(e) -------- ( )1
assez informé(e) ------------ ( )2
pas trop informé(e) --------- ( )3 *10*
Ou pas informé(e) du tout ------ ( )4

2. De manière générale, à votre avis combien d'influence le Canada a-t-il, en tant que nation, sur le cours des événements mondiaux? Diriez-vous que le Canada a ...? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

beaucoup d'influence -------- ( )1
une certaine influence ------ ( )2
très peu d'influence -------- ( )3 *20*
Ou pas d'influence du tout ----- ( )4

3. Laquelle des situations suivantes constitue à votre avis la menace la plus grande à la paix mondiale? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Les actions soviétiques sur la scène internationale ---------------------------- ( )1

Les actions des États-Unis sur la scène internationale ---------------------- ( )2

La course aux armements des superpuissances -------------------------- ( )3 *30*

Le déploiement des armes nucléaires dans les pays plus petits ----------------- ( )4

La situation prévalant au Moyen-Orient ----- ( )5

Ou Les conflits ailleurs dans le monde -------- ( )6

4. Comment qualifieriez-vous le niveau de confiance que vous avez en l'aptitude des États-Unis à s'occuper prudemment des problèmes mondiaux actuels? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Très grand ------------- ( )1
Considérable ----------- ( )2
Faible ----------------- ( )3
Très faible ------------ ( )4 40
Ou Aucune confiance ------- ( )5

5. Comment qualifieriez-vous le niveau de confiance que vous avez en l'aptitude de l'Union soviétique à s'occuper prudemment des problèmes mondiaux actuels? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Très grand ------------- ( )1
Considérable ----------- ( )2
Faible ----------------- ( )3
Très faible ------------ ( )4 50
Ou Aucune confiance ------- ( )5

6. Du point de vue de la force nucléaire globale, lequel des énoncés ci-dessous correspond le mieux à votre impression des États-Unis et de l'Union soviétique? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Les États-Unis sont plus puissants que l'Union soviétique en ce qui concerne la force nucléaire globale ---------------- ( )1

Les États-Unis sont plus faibles que l'Union soviétique en ce qui concerne la force nucléaire globale ------------------------ ( )2 60

Ou Les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique sont à peu près sur le même pied en ce qui concerne la force nucléaire globale actuellement --- ( )3

7. Qu'est-ce qui serait le mieux d'après vous ...? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Que les États-Unis soient en tête au point de vue de la force militaire totale ------- ( )1

Que l'Union soviétique soit en tête au point de vue de la force militaire totale ------- ( )2 70

Ou Que les deux superpuissances soient à peu près sur le même pied au point de vue de la force militaire totale -------------------- ( )3

8a) Si vous pensez maintenant à la guerre nucléaire, à votre avis, dans quelle mesure est-il probable qu'il y ait une guerre nucléaire au cours des vingt-cinq prochaines années? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Très probable ----- ( )1
Probable ---------- ( )2
Improbable -------- ( )3 80
Ou Très improbable --- ( )4

8b) Diriez-vous que le risque de l'éclatement d'une guerre nucléaire est maintenant plus grand, moins grand ou égal qu'il était il y a dix ans? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Plus grand -------- ( )1
Moins grand ------- ( )2 90
Ou Égal -------------- ( )3

9. Au cours des dix prochaines années, dans quelle mesure est-il probable que l'Union soviétique attaque ...? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS POUR CHAQUE LIGNE)**

	Très probable	Probable	Improbable	Très improbable	
L'Europe de l'Ouest ---------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	100
L'Amérique du Nord ----------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	110
Le Japon --------------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	120
La Chine --------------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	130

10. Avec lequel des énoncés suivants êtes-vous le plus d'accord? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

L'Union soviétique est une menace militaire parce qu'elle est une superpuissance possédant des armes nucléaires ---------------------------- ( )1

L'Union soviétique est une menace militaire parce que sa force militaire pourrait être utilisée à l'avenir comme cela a été le cas en Afghanistan - ( )2 140

Ou L'Union soviétique n'est pas une menace militaire -------------------------------- ( )3

11a) À votre avis, qu'est-ce qui causerait plus probablement une guerre nucléaire, une attaque nucléaire déclenchée par accident ou une attaque préméditée? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Attaque déclenchée par accident -- ( )1
Attaque préméditée --------------- ( )2 150

11b) D'après ce que vous pensez qui surviendrait le plus probablement, une attaque accidentelle ou une attaque préméditée, qui en serait le plus probablement responsable? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

L'Union soviétique ---------- ( )1
Les États-Unis -------------- ( )2
Les deux superpuissances ---- ( )3 160
Ou Un autre pays quelconque ---- ( )4

12a) Croyez-vous que le principal intérêt de l'Union soviétique est la domination mondiale ou la protection de sa propre sécurité nationale? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Domination mondiale ------------------------- ( )1
Protection de sa propre sécurité nationale - ( )2 170

12b) Croyez-vous que le principal intérêt des États-Unis est la domination mondiale ou la protection de sa propre sécurité nationale? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Domination mondiale ------------------------- ( )1
Protection de sa propre sécurité nationale - ( )2 180

13a) Certaines personnes croient que les dirigeants soviétiques ne veulent pas sincèrement le désarmement. D'autres personnes croient qu'effectivement ils veulent sincèrement le désarmement.

Laquelle de ces deux opinions se rapproche le plus de la vôtre? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Ne veulent pas le désarmement ---- ( )1
Veulent le désarmement ----------- ( )2 190

13b) Certaines personnes croient que les dirigeants américains ne veulent pas sincèrement le désarmement. D'autres personnes croient qu'effectivement ils veulent sincèrement le désarmement.

Laquelle de ces deux opinions se rapproche le plus de la vôtre? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Ne veulent pas le désarmement ---- ( )1
Veulent le désarmement ----------- ( )2 200

14. De façon générale, lequel des objectifs ci-dessous est le plus désirable d'après vous? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

L'élimination de toutes les armes nucléaires partout dans le monde ---------- ( )1

Ou Que les pays comme les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique aient juste assez d'armes nucléaires de sorte qu'aucun pays n'oserait les attaquer ----------------------------- ( )2 210

15. Certaines personnes disent que les armes nucléaires ont en fait aidé à empêcher une guerre et que le monde serait un endroit beaucoup plus dangereux sans elles. Ceci parce que ces personnes croient que la probabilité d'une guerre serait plus grande si nous avions uniquement des armes conventionnelles non-nucléaires. Êtes-vous ...? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

vraiment d'accord ------ ( )1
d'accord --------------- ( )2
en désaccord ----------- ( )3 220
Ou vraiment en désaccord -- ( )4

16a) Au cours de la rencontre au sommet de Washington en décembre dernier, il y a eu des progrès dans les pourparlers sur le désarmement entre les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique. Ces pourparlers ont abouti à un accord sur l'élimination des forces nucléaires intermédiaires en Europe, le traité FNI.

À votre avis, à qui devons-nous le plus d'être arrivés à cet accord? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Aux États-Unis --------- ( )1
À l'Union soviétique --- ( )2
Aux deux --------------- ( )3 230
Ou Ni à l'un ni à l'autre - ( )4

16b) Croyez-vous que ce traité fait du monde un endroit plus sûr, un endroit moins sûr, ou est-ce qu'il ne fait pas beaucoup de différence? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Plus sûr ---------------------------- ( )1
Moins sûr --------------------------- ( )2 240
Ou Ne fait pas beaucoup de différence -- ( )3

16c) Si vous pensez à tout l'arsenal nucléaire détenu par les deux superpuissances, est-ce que le traité FNI élimine ...? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

La majeure partie de cet arsenal ----------- ( )1
Environ la moitié de cet arsenal ----------- ( )2 250
Ou Un très faible pourcentage de cet arsenal -- ( )3

17a) À quel point diriez-vous que le président Reagan est digne de confiance sur les questions nucléaires et de contrôle des armements? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Très digne de confiance ----- ( )1
Assez digne de confiance ---- ( )2
Assez indigne de confiance -- ( )3 260
Ou Très indigne de confiance --- ( )4

17b) À quel point diriez-vous que le chef soviétique, Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, est digne de confiance sur les questions nucléaires et de contrôle des armements? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Très digne de confiance ----- ( )1
Assez digne de confiance ---- ( )2
Assez indigne de confiance -- ( )3 270
Ou Très indigne de confiance --- ( )4

18. Croyez-vous que l'Union soviétique est sincère lorsqu'elle veut limiter les armements également des deux côtés ou qu'elle veut se servir des accords sur le contrôle des armements pour assurer la supériorité soviétique sur le plan des armements? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Veut sincèrement limiter les armements également des deux côtés ------------------ ( )1

Ou Veut surtout se servir des accords sur le contrôle des armements pour assurer la supériorité soviétique sur le plan des armements ----------------------------- ( )2 280

19. Certaines personnes pensent qu'une réduction substantielle des armes nucléaires existantes ralentirait considérablement la course aux armements.

D'autres personnes disent que même si les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique réduisaient le nombre d'armes qu'ils possèdent actuellement, ils continueront à mettre au point et à produire des armes encore plus destructrices; ainsi la course aux armes nucléaires se poursuivra.

Avec laquelle de ces deux opinions êtes-vous le plus d'accord? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Les réductions ralentiront la course aux armes nucléaires -------------------------- ( )1

Ou Des armes encore plus destructrices continueront d'être mises au point; ainsi la course aux armes nucléaires se poursuivra - ( )2 290

20. Plusieurs discussions ont lieu en ce moment concernant le contrôle des armements. Veuillez faire l'évaluation de l'importance (ou du manque d'importance) de chacun des énoncés ci-dessous. **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS POUR CHAQUE ÉNONCÉ)**

	Très important	Assez important	Pas très important	
La réduction des forces conventionnelles non-nucléaires en Europe ------------------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	300
La réduction des armes nucléaires à long rayon d'action (c'est-à-dire, les pourparlers "START")	( )1	( )2	( )3	310
Le contrôle des armes chimiques -----------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	320

21a) Comme vous le savez peut-être, les États-Unis et l'Union soviétique discutaient récemment lors de la rencontre au sommet de Moscou de réduire de moitié leurs armements nucléaires stratégiques à long rayon d'action, tels que les missil intercontinentaux.

Croyez-vous qu'un accord de ce genre ferait du monde un endroit plus sûr, un endroit moins sûr, ou est-ce que cela ne ferait pas beaucoup de différence? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Plus sûr ---------------------------- ( )1
Moins sûr --------------------------- ( )2 330
Ou Ne fait pas beaucoup de différence -- ( )3

21b) Certaines personnes disent que nous devrions tenter d'arriver à une entente dès que possible sur les réductions de ces armes stratégiques. D'autres personnes disent que nous devrions attendre jusqu'à ce que nous sachions si l'Union soviétique respecte les accords existant déjà, entre autres le traité FNI.

Avec laquelle de ces opinions êtes-vous le plus d'accord? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE)**

Devrions tenter d'arriver à une entente dès que possible ------------- ( )1
Devrions attendre jusqu'à ce que nous sachions si l'Union soviétique respecte les accords existant déjà --------------- ( )2 340

22. S'il était effectivement possible aux superpuissances de négocier l'élimination d'un grand nombre de leur armes nucléaires, quelle sorte de réduction des armements nucléaires considéreriez-vous le plus désirable au cours des dix prochaines années? Est-ce que les superpuissances devraient...? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Maintenir les niveaux actuels -------------------- ( )1
Maintenir seulement 50% des niveaux actuels (autrement dit, une réduction de moitié) -------- ( )2 350
Maintenir seulement 10% des niveaux actuels ------ ( )3
Ou Éliminer toutes les armes nucléaires ------------- ( )4

23. Pour chaque description ou énoncé ci-dessous, je vous prie de cocher "X" la case qui représente dans quelle mesure vous êtes d'accord ou en désaccord avec chaque description ou énoncé.

Si vous êtes vraiment en désaccord avec l'énoncé, cochez "X" la case dans la colonne "vraiment en désaccord". Si vous êtes vraiment d'accord avec l'énoncé, cochez "X" la case dans la colonne "vraiment d'accord". Les réponses de certaines personnes si situent quelque part entre ces deux points, tout dépendant de leur sentiment concernant l'énoncé ou la description. **(POUR CHACUN DES ÉNONCÉS CI-DESSOUS, COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE)**

	Vraiment en désaccord	En désaccord	D'accord	Vraiment d'accord	
La menace militaire soviétique est en croissance constante et représente un danger réel et immédiat pour l'Ouest ------------------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	360
Les pays de l'OTAN (Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique Nord) devraient être prêts à utiliser de petites armes nucléaires comme dernier recours à une attaque soviétique conventionnelle (c.-à-d. non-nucléaire) en Europe de l'Ouest qui écraserait les défenses occidentales -------------------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	370
Lorsqu'il est question d'accords sur le désarmement, on ne peut pas vraiment faire confiance à l'Union soviétique pour qu'elle respecte sa part du marché -	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	380
Lorsqu'il est question d'accords sur le désarmement, on ne peut pas vraiment faire confiance aux États-Unis pour qu'ils respectent leur part du marché ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	390
Nous ne devrions donner notre accord à aucun désarmement substantiel à moins que l'inspection des installations nucléaires de tous les pays ne soit si méticuleuse qu'il n'y ait aucun risque de tricherie ----------------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	400
L'Ouest peut déceler presque à coup sûr une tricherie des Soviétiques à un accord sur le désarmement ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	410
La sécurité des pays de l'Ouest serait accrue de façon optimale par des réductions substantielles des arsenaux nucléaires américains et soviétiques ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	420
Une interdiction de tous les essais d'armes nucléaires finirait par miner la puissance de l'Ouest et notre aptitude à dissuader une agression des Soviétiques ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	430
La force militaire n'est plus une façon appropriée pour des pays d'arriver à leurs intérêts ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	440
Le rôle du Canada au sein de l'Organisation du traité de l'Atlantique nord (OTAN) devrait être réduit ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	450
Le gouvernement canadien devrait dépenser beaucoup plus pour sa défense ------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	460
Le gouvernement canadien devrait augmenter les taxes afin d'accroître ses dépenses à la défense ---	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	470
Le Canada devrait doter ses Forces armées d'armes nucléaires -----------------	( )1	( )2	( )3	( )4	480

. Si le gouvernement canadien augmentait sa force de défense, à votre avis, quelle serait la meilleure raison d'agir de la sorte? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Les forces canadiennes doivent être plus fortes afin d'aider à la défense des pays de l'Ouest -- ( )1
Le Canada doit avoir une plus grande influence au sein de l'OTAN ----- ( )2 490
Ou Le Canada devrait faire un meilleur travail dans la protection de son territoire et sa souveraineté -------------------------------- ( )3

. S'il était possible de réduire la dépendance de l'OTAN sur le plan des armements nucléaires, seriez-vous pour ou contre une augmentation des dépenses à la défense du Canada pour renforcer les forces conventionnelles de l'OTAN? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Serait pour ------- ( )1 500
Serait contre ----- ( )2

26. Le gouvernement canadien a récemment fait part de son intention de faire l'achat de douze sous-marins nucléaires, afin de permettre aux Forces Armées de patrouiller les trois océans entourant le Canada. Approuvez-vous ou désapprouvez-vous ce projet? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Désapprouve complètement --------- ( )1
Désapprouve ---------------------- ( )2 510
Approuve ------------------------- ( )3
Approuve complètement ------------ ( )4

27. Êtes-vous le chef masculin ou le chef féminin de votre foyer? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Chef masculin du foyer ------ ( )1
Chef féminin du foyer ------- ( )2 520
Autre membre du foyer ------- ( )3

28. Auriez-vous l'obligeance d'indiquer ci-dessous auquel des groupes d'âge vous appartenez?

18 à 24 ans ------- ( )1
25 à 34 ans ------- ( )2
35 à 44 ans ------- ( )3 530
45 à 54 ans ------- ( )4
55 à 64 ans ------- ( )5
65 ans au plus ---- ( )6

29a) Veuillez indiquer ci-dessous votre situation d'emploi? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Prend soin du foyer à plein temps ----- ( )9 → ALLEZ À LA QU.30
À la retraite ou sans emploi de façon permanente --------------------- ( )0 → ALLEZ À LA QU.30 540
Travaille à mi-temps (moins de 28 heures par semaine) ----------------- ( )1 → CONTINUEZ
Travaille à plein temps --------------- ( )2 → CONTINUEZ

29b) Laquelle des catégories suivantes décrit cet emploi? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Profession libérale ------------------------ ( )1
Direction/gérance -------------------------- ( )2
Ventes ------------------------------------- ( )3
Travail de bureau -------------------------- ( )4 550
Main d'oeuvre (sans formation technique) --- ( )5
Main d'oeuvre (avec formation technique) --- ( )6
Agriculteur/agriculture (autonome) --------- ( )7
Étudiant ----------------------------------- ( )8

30. Quelle a été la dernière année de scolarité que vous avez terminée? **(COCHEZ "X" UNE CASE CI-DESSOUS)**

Niveau primaire ----------------------------------- ( )1
Une partie du cours secondaire ------------------ ( )2 560
Cours secondaire terminé ------------------------ ( )3
CEGEP/collège universitaire/université en partie - ( )4
Diplômé(e) de collège universitaire/
d'université ------------------------------------ ( )5
Autre formation post-secondaire ----------------- ( )6